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ALTERNATIVE STANDARDS FOR
THE TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS
James Boskey* and John W. McCue**
An examination of New Jersey statutory and judicial standardsfor
the termination of parental rights indicates to the authors that a
revolution is occurring of noteworthy significance. Discussions of
the theory of psychological parenthood and the state's power as
parens patriae, coupled with critical evaluations of several proposed solutions to the problems involved in termination actions,
lead the authors to suggest that viable alternatives do exist and
may be offered as the bases for statutory reform.
INTRODUCTION

There is a revolution in progress in the American law of the family. The revolution began slowly in the 1940s and 1950s with attempts
to eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy I and continued into the 1960s
with the expansion of no-fault grounds for divorce. 2 In the 1970s,
the revolution endures with the recognition of the necessity to pro-
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1 Reform has continued in this area to the present with most of the constitutional decisions
on discrimination against illegitimates arising during the 1970s. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762 (1977). By the early 1960s, all of the states had legitimation statutes and much reform

had taken place with regard to the rights of the illegitimate. H.
§§ 5.2, 5A, at 158 n.1, 176-80 (1968).

CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMES-

TIC RELATIONS

2 While in some states such reform predated the 1960s, it was during this decade that
no-fault grounds became the primary form of divorce throughout the United States. See Foster,
Divorce Reform and the Uniform Act, 7 FAM. L.Q. 179, 179-84 (1973).
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tect children against parental misconduct and to abolish the archaic
standards for the termination of parental rights.
There are many circumstances in which the state may attempt to
intervene in the functioning of an ongoing family. Such intervention
is usually not objectionable as it relates only to the interactions between the family and society. In recent years, however, it has been
increasingly recognized that some parents are not sufficiently qualified to provide for their children's upbringing. 3 Although individuality in child rearing techniques should be encouraged so as to assure
the maintenance of cultural diversity, the state cannot tolerate practices which will prevent the child from ever assuming a productive
role in society. 4 The question of what practices may be prohibited
under this approach is indeed difficult, and serious doubts exist concerning the power of the state to intervene in such areas as education 5 and health care. 6 Some practices, however, such as child
abuse and neglect, are so abhorrent that they cannot be tolerated.
See generally C. KEMPE & R. HELFER, HELPING THE BATTERED CHILD AND His FAMILY (1972).
4 1 HEW, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE PROBLEM AND ITS MANAGEMENT 2-3 (1976).
5 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
6 A recent example of the controversy inherent in the state's power to intervene in health
care is the case of In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).

In re Quinlan concerned a twenty-one year old woman, Karen Ann Quinlan, who was
hospitalized as a result of her comatose state. 70 N.J. at 23, 355 A.2d at 653-54. Although
Karen was kept alive with the assistance of a respirator, doctors believed she would be unable
to breathe without it. Id. at 23, 355 A.2d at 654. After numerous unsuccessful attempts to
remove her from the respirator, it was decided that she was dependent upon it for her continued existence. Id. at 25, 355 A.2d at 655.
Mr. Quinlan, Karen's father, requested the discontinuance of Karen's life-sustaining medical treatment. Id. at 22, 355 A.2d at 653. As a result of Karen's doctors' refusal to disconnect
the respirator, Mr. Quinlan instituted an action in the Chancery Division of the Superior Court
of New Jersey. Id. The court, however, refused to withdraw Karen's life-support system. Id. at
18, 355 A.2d at 651. Certification was granted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. Id.
In reversing the lower court's opinion, Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the court, stated:
We have no hesitancy in deciding . . . that no external compelling interest of the
State could compel Karen to endure the unendurable, only to vegetate a few
measurable months with no realistic possibility of returning to any semblance of
cognitive or sapient life.
Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663. Although the court recognized the sovereign's obligation to preserve
life, it also indicated that the. State's interest must be balanced against the equally important
right to privacy. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. The court considered the right to privacy broad
enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment in particular situations:
The nature of Karen's case and the realistic chances of her recovery are quite unlike
those of the patients discussed in many of the cases where treatments were ordered. In many of those cases the medical procedure required (usually a transfusion) constituted a minimal bodily invasion and the chances of recovery and return
to functioning life were very good.
Id. at 40-41, 355 A.2d at 664. It is evident that the medical procedures to be implemented and
the attendant results to be realized from their utilization were a vital consideration in the court's
balancing of the State's interest in the preservation of life and the individual's right to privacy.
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The state is severely restricted in responding to such clearly prohibitable actions. If the improper conduct is criminal, then fines and
imprisonment can be imposed on the parent to prevent a repetition
of such conduct. Furthermore, these penalties serve as a deterrent to
other potential offenders. 7 Criminal prosecution of the parent, however, provides little or no benefit to the injured child: there is no
direct effect on the parent's right to reclaim custody of the child.
Moreover, imprisonment or fines may increase the parent's hostility
toward the child. 8
There is a need for civil remedies which furnish a child with
suitable protection when threatened by a harmful domestic environment. To provide such care, courts have developed remedies ranging
from an order of temporary custody for f'oster parents to remedial
counseling services. Yet, there are certain situations in which home
remedies are inadequate. In such cases, the primary remedy available
for the protection of the child is the termination of parental rights. 9

We think that the State's interest contra weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims. Ultimately, there comes a point at which the individual's rights overcome the State
interest.
Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
Although Karen Quinlan was an adult, her legal status was not unlike that of a minor, since
her comatose condition rendered her incompetent to independently exercise her right to privacy. Id. For this reason, Mr. Quinlan, as Karen's guardian, attempted to assert her interests as
would a guardian of a minor legally incapable of making a medical decision.
The court, in fashioning its declaratory relief, established a specific procedure to terminate
Karen's life sustaining treatment:
Upon the concurrence of the guardian and family of Karen, sfiould the responsible
attending physicians conclude that there is no reasonable possibility of Karen's ever
emerging from her present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state and that
the life-support apparatus now being administered to Karen should be discontinued,
they shall consult with the hospital 'Ethics Committee' or like body of the institution in which Karen is then hospitalized. If that consultative body agrees that there
is no reasonable possibility of Karen's ever emerging from her present comatose
condition to a cognitive, sapient state, the present life-support system may be withdrawn.
Id. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671. By requiring multiple assent in the decision to withdraw Karen's
treatment, the court has attempted to prevent unwarranted reliance on the right to privacy as a
means of overcoming the prevailing state interest in the preservation of life. For a discussion of
other cases exploring the role of the state in child health care, see H. KRAus, FAMILY LAW 557
(1976).
' A good summary of many of these state laws appears in Katz, Child Neglect Laws in
America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 3, 75-362 (1975).
s H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 6.5, at 201.
9 For a comparative perspective on this problem, see Eekelaar, Deprivation of Parental
Rights: Legislative Contrasts in England, Wales, Australia and Canada, 7 FAM. L.Q. 381
(1973).
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The termination of parental rights is an extraordinary judicial
remedy which is to be granted only after intensive consideration of
parental conduct and the needs of the child. Judicial caution in granting termination arises from the permanent and irreversible nature of
the order. 0 Termination involves the elimination of any legal recognition of a continuing parent-child relationship11 and, usually, the
end of any social recognition of the relationship. This remedy may be
contrasted with a custody order which vests a non-parent with temporary authority over a child, but does not eliminate the parent's residual right to reclaim the child at some later date. 1 2 The award of
custody does not imply that termination will follow, nor are the standards for the two awards similar, except in their most general aspects.' 3 While custody is freely granted for the temporary protection
of a child against impending harm, termination reflects a decision that
no substantial likelihood exists that a proper parent-child relationship
is capable of being restored in the future.
Although most statutory provisions for the termination of parental rights articulate the "best interests of the child" as a primary factor
to be evaluated in the decision to terminate,' 4 the legislatures and
courts have placed substantial emphasis upon the rights of the parent
in such actions. 1 5 Any standard to be developed for the termination
of parental rights must take account of these prerogatives. The standard must not, however, allow them to supersede the fundamental
right of the child to a permanent home. The proper balancing of
these interests has been, and continues to be, the subject of substantial litigation and attempted and actual statutory reform.
The revolution taking place with regard to the rights of the child
is evidenced by the increasing judicial reliance upon psychological
principles relating to the placement of the child. Traditional approaches to the factors involved in a determination of the "best interests of the child" are now being supplanted by direct analysis of
the child's problems and the methods by which they should be resolved.
The recent decisions of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
Sees v. Baber 16 and Sorentino v. Family & Children's Society of
10

E.g., In re N., 96 N.J. Super. 415, 423-24, 233 A.2d 188, 192-93 (App. Div. 1967).

See generally H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 18.5 (1968).
12 In re Adoption of J., 139 N.J. Super. 533, 548, 354 A.2d 662, 669 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd
11

on other grounds, 73 N.J. 68, 372 A.2d 607 (1977); see Sorentino v. Family & Children's Soc'y
of Elizabeth, 74 N.J. 313, 321 & n.1, 378 A.2d 18, 22 (1977).
13 See Sorentino v. Family & Children's Soc'y of Elizabeth, 74 N.f. 313, 321 & n.1, 378

A.2d 18, 22 (1977).
14 The words "best interests of children" are specifically used in the New Jersey Adoption
Law. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-37 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
15 See 'text accompanying notes 153-56 infra.
16 74 N.J. 201, 377 A.2d 628 (1977).
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Elizabeth 17 signal a judicial cognizance of the necessity to develop a

new approach for termination and custody. These decisions demonstrate a novel application of parens patriae, an historical element of
the court's equitable jurisdiction, as a justification for the court's increased recognition of the child's rights and interests in termination
and custody decisions. The Sees decision represents a radical use of
parens patriae, in granting termination based solely on the welfare of
the child regardless of parental rights, absent parental misconduct l a
This interpretation of parens patriae exhibits a marked departure
from the traditional belif that the best interests of the child require
termination only in circumstances where one or both parents can be
found totally and permanently unfit to retain custody of their children. 19

Discussion of the revolution in termination standards will begin
with an analysis of the current New Jersey statutory scheme for the
termination of parental rights with a subsequent analysis of case law
standards prior to Sees and Sorentino. An examination of psychological parenthood, the theoretical foundation for the modern approach to
termination of parental rights, will then be presented. Next, the author will discuss the Sees and Sorentino standards and the parens
patriae approach to termination which they suggest. Finally, a series
of proposals for new methods of termination will be outlined and an
analysis offered of their potential. The analysis suggests that several
viable alternatives for dealing with termination actions, without the
abridgement of the rights of any party, do exist, and can be offered as
bases for statutory reform.
CURRENT STATUTORY STANDARDS
FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

Three separate statutory approaches to the termination of parental rights exist in New Jersey: surrender-termination, generaltermination and adoption-termination.
The Surrender-Termination Approach
Applicable only where a parent of the child has executed a surrender of custody to an approved agency, the surrender-termination
approach requires that the agency, as plaintiff, represent the child in
the termination action. 20 Since the document of surrender itself
17 72 N.J. 127, 367 A.2d 1168, juris. retained, 74 N.J. 313, 378 A.2d 18 (1977).
Is 74 N.J. at 221, 377 A.2d at 638; see notes 204-20 infra and accompanying text.
19 See text accompanying notes 133-38 infra.
20 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2-18, -19 (West 1976).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:1

must contain certain formal provisions, the court must assess the validity of the document. In the alternative, the court need only find
21 When a surrender
that the parent intended to surrender the child.
is executed, it is fully valid, regardless of the parents' ages. The surrender is revocable only at the discretion of the approved agency in
which the child was placed, or upon a finding by a proper court that
22
the surrender was obtained by fraud, duress, or misrepresentation.
If only one parent executes a document of surrender, the court is
required to examine the parental rights of the non-executing parent.2 3 It is specifically provided that the act of surrender by one
parent does not affect the rights of the other. 24 Furthermore, a judicial termination of one parent's rights does not necessarily terminate
the rights of the other. 25 Termination of the rights of the nonsurrendering parent will occur only on specified statutory grounds: a
determination that the other parent is "dead, . . . mentally incompetent, . . . has forsaken parental obligations or has been divorced by
the [surrendering] parent" on fault grounds. 2 6 In addition, if the
child is illegitimate and the surrender is executed by the mother, the
statute provides "that the father, and the husband of the mother if
she is married, shall have no right to custody of the child." 27 Finally, in an appropriate case, the court may terminate the parental
authority of any previously appointed custodian or guardian of the
child. 28 Upon the completion of these inquiries, the court may order
the termination of parental rights and the transfer of the right to cus29 The order
tody and control over the child to the plaintiff-agency.
precludes all control of the child by the parent or guardian, but does
21 Id. §§ 9:2-17, -19. The surrender must include a declaration of the intent of the part, to
relinquish custody, a formal acknowledgement of the termination of the surrendering parent's
rights in favor of the approved agency, and a further acknowledgment of a full understanding of
the effect of such surrender. Id. § 9:2-17.
22 Id. § 9:2-16. Surrenders under this statute are infrequently challenged. For a discussion
of this statute, see Sees v. Baber, 74 N.J. at 212-13, 377 A.2d at 634; In re Adoption by J.B. &
F.B., 63 N.J. Super. 98, 102, 164 A.2d 65, 67 (App. Div. 1960).
23 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-15 (West 1976). It is not clear, however, that a final order of
termination can be granted under the statute unless the parental rights of the non-surrendering
parent are terminated. See id. § 9:2-20.
24 Id. § 9:2-15.
25 See id. §§ 9:2-15, -20.

26 Id. § 9:2-19. "The phrase 'mentally incompetent' means inability to understand and
discharge the natural and regular obligations of care and support of a child by reason of mental
disease, feebleness of mind, or habitual intemperance." id. § 9:2-13(e).
27 Id. § 9:2-19. It should be noted that the father of an illegitimate child is expressly
excluded from the statutory definition of "parent." Id.

§ 9:2-13(f). For a discussion of this

section, see text accompanying notes 51--54 and 58-60 infra.
28 Id.
29 Id.

§ 9:2-20.
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not relieve either of financial responsibility for the child's continued
support.30
The General-Termination Approach
Under this approach, a petition for termination may be brought,
not only by an approved agency, but by any person, association or
agency interested in the child's welfare, and, when appropriate, by
the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS or Division). 3 1 The
statute provides for the filing of a petition by such a party if: a "person having custody of" a child has been convicted of child abuse,
neglect, cruelty or abandonment; the named "child has been adjudged delinquent;" "the best interests of [a] child" under the custody of the Division requires guardianship; custody has been taken
away from the parent or guardian of a child and has been granted to
the Division; or, following the voluntary placement of the child with
an agency, the parent has failed to maintain contact with the child for
one year, although the parent is able to do so. 3 2 Upon the filing of a

30 Id.

31 Id. § 30:4C-15 (West 1964). It should be noted that the Division of Youth and Familv
Services (DYFS) is the successor agency of the Bureau of Children's Services mentioned in the
statute. See id. § 30:4C-2(a) (West Cun. Supp. 1977-1978).
32 Id. § 30:4C-15 (West 1964). Under the fourth basis in this section, DYFS must have
obtained custody pursuant to either section 30:4C-11 or section 30:4C-12. The former section
requires DYFS to take custody of a child if, on verification of a complaint to the Division, it
appears:
(a) that the welfare of such child will be endangered unless proper care and custody
is provided;
(b) that the needs of such child cannot properly be provided for by financial assistance as made available by the laws of this State;
(c) that there is no person legally responsible for the support of such child whose
identity and whereabouts are known and who is willing and able to provide for the
care and support required by such child; and
(d) that such child, if suffering from a mental or physical disability requiring institutional care, is not immediately admissable to any public institution providing such
care.
Id. § 30:4C-11. The latter section provides for the assumption of custody on court order if it
appear[s] that the parent or parents, guardian, or person having custody and control
of any child within this State is grossly immoral or unfit to be entrusted with the
care and education of such child, or shall fail to provide such child with proper
protection, maintenance and education, or is of such vicious, careless or dissolute
habits as to endanger the welfare of such child . . ..

If. . . it appears that the child requires care and supervision by the Bureau of
Children's Services but the parent, parents, guardian, or persons having custody
and control of the child continue to refuse to apply for care . . ., tl e bureau may
apply to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of the county where the child
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petition, a court may issue an interlocutory order, committing the
33 If
child to DYFS's custody pending the outcome of the hearing.
DYFS is not the petitioner, the court is directed to give notice of the
petition to the Division, 34 which then must investigate the situation
and report its findings to the court. 35 If, as a result of the required
hearing, it is concluded that a final termination order should be issued, DYFS assumes control of the child's person and property, and
may consent to adoption by a third party3 6 or another mode of
placement.
The Adoption-Termination Approach
When adoption is desired and termination has not yet been secured under one of the previous approaches, it usually occurs at the
preliminary hearing in the adoption proceeding. 37 The court is required to make a determination of the natural parents' right to custody based upon their compliance with substantial procedural and
substantive prerequisites.3 8 Notice must be given to any parent
whose rights have not been previously terminated, or who has not
executed a surrender to an approved agency. 3 9 Such notice may not
be waived and must include the purpose, date, and place of the hearing, the parent's right to appear and object to the adoption, the right
to counsel and the right to have counsel appointed in the case of
indigency. 40 The statute includes in the definition of "'parent," a
"natural father" of an illegitimate child "who has acknowledged the
child" 4 1 or who must be notified because of his "relationship with the
resides for an order making the child a ward of the court and placing such child
under the care and supervision of the Bureau of Children's Services.

Id. § 30:4C-12.
11 id. § 30:4C-17.
34 Id.

"

Id.

§ 30:4C-12.

§§ 30:4C-20, -22.
DYFS is also empowered to
child. Id. § 30:4C-23. Surrender
demonstrated that acceptance of
child. Id. The surrender must be
36 Id.

accept voluntary surrenders of the custody and control of a
in these cases is only to be received after investigation has
the surrender would be permanently advantageous to the
notarized and is "irrevocable except at the discretion of the

Bureau of Children's Services or upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction." Id.

" See id. §§ 9:3-47(c), -48(c)(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). The current statute became
effective in 1978. Id. § 9:3-37 note (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). Compare id. §§ 9:3-17 to 36
(West 1976) (repealed 1978) with id. §§ 9:3-37 to 56 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
38 Id. § 9:3-41 to 48 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
39 Id. § 9:3-45.
40 Id.
41 Id. § 9:3-38(f). Under the old law, "parent" was defined "not [to] include the father of an
illegitimate child." Id. § 9:3-18(f) (West 1976) (repealed 1978).
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child, financial or otherwise." 42 If a parent does choose to object,
the statute prohibits the adoption, absent a finding that "such parent
has substantially failed to perform the regular and expected parental
functions of care and support . . . includ[ing] maintenance of an emotional relationship with the child." 43 If the prospective adoptive
parents have not received custody of the child through an approved
agency, the statute specifies a biftircated proceeding in which termination occurs at a prelimrinary hearing held sixty to ninety days after
the adoption action is instituted. 44 Termination may be based upon a
finding of "intentional abandonment or very substantial neglect of parental duties without a reasonable expectation of a reversal of that
conduct." 45 It should be noted, however, that a direct surrenddr by
the natural parents to the adoptive parents is not conclusive. 46 Finally, if the adoption is by a "relative," as defined by the statute, the
agency report may be limited or waived and the bifurcated proceed47
ing may be consolidated into a single hearing.

PROBLEMS WITH THE EXISTING TERMINATION STATUTES

From the viewpoint of the natural parent in a termination action,
two major rights must be protected-notice of the proposed termination and an opportunity to be heard. 48 The requirement of notice
and an opportunity to be heard for an absent parent or one who has
not been joined as a party in a termination or adoption proceeding
has recently been elevated to constitutional levels by the Supreme
Court's decision in Stanley v. Illinois. 9 That decision involved the
50
parental rights of an unwed father upon the death of the mother.
Upon the mother's death, proceedings were instituted by the State of
42 Id. § 9:3-45 (West Corn. Supp. 1978-1979). For a discussion of this section, see text
accompanying notes 59-61 and 65-67 infra.
" Id. § 9:3-46(a) (West Cuin. Snpp. 1978-1979).
14 Id. § 9:3-48.

41 Id. § 9:3-48(c)(1).
46 Sees v. Baber, 74 N.J. at 215, 377 A.2d at 635. For a detailed discussion of Sees, see

notes 204-20 infra and accompanying text.
4' N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-48(c)(4) (West Curm. Supp. 1978-1979).
41 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). For a discussion of the protection of parental
rights, see Ketcham & Babcock, Statutory Standardsfor the Involuntarij Ternination of Parental Rights, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 530 (1976); Simpson, The Unfit Parent: Conditions Under

Which

a Child May Be Adopted Without the Consent of His Parent, 39 DET. L.J. 347 (1962);
Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standardsfor Removal of Children
from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv'. 623 (1976).
49

405 U.S. 645 (1972).

50 Id. at 646-47.
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Illinois which resulted in the appointment of a guardian. 51 The state
court had refused the father an opportunity to be heard with respect
to the children's disposition by the Illinois court.5 2 The Supreme
Court found the state procedure violative of due process and declared
that any natural parent is entitled to notice and the opportunity to
contest proceedings in the case of adoption or termination. 5 3 The
scope of Stanley has since been limited to those situations where the
the child, at
parent has actively maintained substantial contact with
54
least when the parent knew of the child's existence.
With respect to the termination of parental rights, the application of Stanley is particularly difficult. To the extent that the rights
involved are personal to the parent, personal service of process may
be necessary to protect these rights. 55 However, the father of a child
born out-of-wedlock may be impossible to identify without the cooperation of the mother. Furthermore, the mother may be unable or
unwilling to identify the father. Thus, the inability of the court or
agency to otherwise determine his identity may seriously hinder an
adoption in an otherwise appropriate case.
The notice problem is especially acute under the current New
Jersey surrender-termination statute. It is clear under this approach
that a decision by a court to terminate parental rights of one parent
does not, per se, affect the rights of the other parent, nor does the
surrender by the custody-holding parent terminate the rights of the
parent who lacks custody. 56 The rights of the parent lacking custody
have been dealt with in the surrender-termination approach by a provision which allows the court to terminate the parental rights of an
absent parent under certain statutorily described circumstances.5 7
Since there is no requirement that notice be given the parent before
a judgment is entered, this provision would not meet the constitutional standards set forth in Stanley. 5 8 While constitutional difficulties remain in the surrender-termination statute, similar problems
have been cured in the recently enacted adoption statute.
Under the current adoption-termination approach, the Stanley
notice requirements have been met. The statute requires that the
51 Id.

Id.
53 Id. at 658.
52

54 Quilloin v. Walcott, 46 U.S.L.W. 4055 (U.S., Jan. 10, 1978).

55 See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1953); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-45 (West
Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
56 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-15 (West 1976); see notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text.
57 Id. § 9:2-19 (West 1976); see note 26 supra and accompanying text.
58 See id.

§ 9:2-18 (West 1976).
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complaint for adoption be served on a parent whose rights have not
been terminated or who has not executed a voluntary surrender. 59 In
addition, a putative father who has maintained some kind of relationship with his child must be given notice personally. 60 The generaltermination approach probably does not meet the requirements of
Stanley. While it requires that service shall "be made upon the parent, parents, guardian or person having custody and control . . . in
accordance with rules of court," it does not provide for service on the
6
putative father. 1
In addition to Stanley's notice requirements, the current statutory schemes must be examined with reference to the parent's opportunity to appear and present his or her view as to the child's custody.
Under the surrender-termination approach, the threshold question to
be determined is that of the validity of the surrender by the
custody-holding parent to the approved agency. 6 2 The'-basis for limiting the inquiry is the assumption that the grant of custody to the
agency is prima facie proof of the inability of the parent to assume
the care of the child. 63 This theory has some validity relative to the
surrendering parent. Even if the parent has regained capacity to care
for the child, the willingness to release the child demonstrates a lack
of concern that would, in most cases, be sufficient for termination of
his or her rights.
With respect to the non-surrendering parent, however, the question is more difficult. The traditional view, as expressed in the
surrender-termination approach, is that a finding'of non-marital
parentage or of fault in a divorce action was determinative of the
incapacity of an individual to raise his or her own children. 6 4 As
both divorce and non-marital sexual relations become more accepted
features of society, it becomes increasingly difficult to assume that
such conduct is inherently immoral or reflective on any abilities of
the parent to properly raise children. It seems clear that the holding
of Stanley has recognized this aspect of social change by providing the
non-surrendering parent the opportunity to prove his or her fitness
for raising the child.

5 Id. § 9:3-45 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); see text accompanying note 42 supra.
60 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-45 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); see text accompanying note 44
supra.
61 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-17 (West 1964).
62 Id. § 9:2-19 (West 1976).
63 See id. This is not expressly stated in the statute, but appears to be the only reasonable
basis which can he'implied.
64 Id. § 9:2-19.
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In contrast, the recently enacted adoption statute fulfills the
Stanley requirements. The statute permits any parent who has not
executed a surrender or been the object of a prior termination proceeding to object to the proceeding. 65 Such an objection is not required in a traditional legal form. It may be "communicated to the
court by personal appearance or by letter." 6 6 Furthermore, the
statute prevents a judgment of adoption absent a finding by the court
67
of substantial neglect of parental duty or a surrender by the parent.
Finally, the general-termination approach also appears to be
satisfactory in this regard. Guardianship cannot be awarded to DYFS
68
absent a demonstration of parental inadequacy or misconduct.
Furthermore, a non-custodial parent has the right to participate in
the hearing and to argue for the return or continuation of custody of
the child. 6 9
From the-viewpoint of the child, however, a number of interests
are not protected by any of the statutory approaches. Principally,
there is a lack of opportunity for the child, either individually or by a
court-appointed guardian ad litem, to present his or her own views as
to the appropriateness of the determination. The traditional assumption that the child's interests are protected by the parent or agency
has been repeatedly condemned, and new procedures are being developed to assure an opportunity for the child to evaluate the situa70
tion and express its own views.

Presently, in an adoption action, a child, ten years of age or
older, is provided the opportunity to speak on his or her own behalf. 7' In a termination action under either of the other statutory
schemes,, however, the child is not provided with the right to present
its views, nor is the child even entitled to notice of the proceedings. 72

In addition to the lack of opportunity to be heard, the in-

terests of the child are minor considerations in many termination proceedings. Under the surrender-termination statute, no inquiry into
the interests of the child is required. 73 Termination is based solely

Id. § 9:3-46(a) (Vest
66 1(1.
65

67

Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).

Id.

68 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4C-15, -20 (West 1964).
69

See id. §§ 30:4C-17, -20.

70

H. CLARK, supra note 1,

§

18.4, at 625.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-49 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). The rule until recently, required that the child's views be presented to the court by the approved agency. Id. § 9:3--28
71

(West 1976) (repealed 1978).
72

73

See id. §§ 9:2-18 to 20 (West 1976); id.§§ 30:4C-11 to 24 (West 1964).
See id. §§ 9:2-18 to 20 (West 1976).
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on the determination of inadequate parental child care embodied in
the surrender of custody. 74 Even under the general-termination
statute, the child is not a party to the litigation. 7 5 Although the
child's view should not be binding since the child may be unable to
evaluate fully the factors which are germane to termination, the
child's comments should not be overlooked.
The failure of the general-termination statute to encourage
prompt termination additionally infringes upon the child's rights.
Children tend to linger in the social service system for extended
periods of time because agencies are unwilling to conclusively decide
future parental unfitness. 7 6 The harm in this delay results from the
fact that the placement of a child for adoption, and the consequent
provision for the child of a permanent and stable home, becomes
more difficult as the child grows older. Thus, the statute must provide the child with the opportunity for timely termination.
A further problem is that there are no courts with special expertise to deal with termination issues. The decisions in termination
cases are rarely easy ones, and the court which is to consider them
should be fully aware of the range of social and economic factors
which come into play in making such decisions. 77 This requires special knowledge of the workings of the social service system and the
evaluation of psychological and sociological evidence bearing upon the
best interests of the child. At present, expertise is usually acquired
through court room experience. The judge who is successful in dealing with these matters, however, is likely to be appointed to a higher
court, where he or she will cease to deal with these cases, whereupon
an inexperienced judge will fill the vacancy. Thus, a consistent degree of expertise in the handling of such matters is rarely present.
CASE LAW FACTORS IN TERMINATION

Having enunciated the statutory requirements for the termination of parental rights, it is appropriate to look to the manner in
which these standards have been applied by the New Jersey courts.
Until the supreme court's recent decisions in Sorentino and Sees, the
most important factor in termination has been the use of "forsaken

7 See id.
75 See id.

§ 9:2-19, -20.
§ 30:4C-12, -15 (West 1964).

7 See generally CLABURN & MAGURA,

FOSTER CARE CASE REVIEW IN NEW JERSEY: AN

EVALUATION OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS (1977).

" For a discussion of the multitude of problems which arise in termination cases, see J.
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973).

GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT,
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parental obligations" as a jurisdictional prerequisite for termination. 78 In re Adoption of Children by D. 79 provides the accepted
judicial interpretation of "forsaken parental obligations" 80 within the
parameters of the statutory definition of "intentional abandonment or
very substantial neglect of parental duties without a reasonable expectation of a reversal of that conduct in the future." 8 '
In order to fully comprehend the termination proceeding involved in In re Adoption of Children by D., it is first necessary to
outline the two step procedure involved in that action. First, the
"jurisdictional question," 82 which entails a finding that the prerequisites for parental unfitness under the adoption statutes have been met,
must be answered. 83 If jurisdiction is found to exist, a court will
then proceed to the second step and address the "dispositional question," in which the best interests and welfare of the child are consi84
dered.
In In re Adoption of Children by D., the supreme court was
faced with an adoption proceeding in the "divorced parents situation." 8 5 The facts of the case indicated that there had been offspring
born of a marriage which had ended in divorce. 8 6 The mother had
retained custody of the children and then married D. who sought to
adopt the children. 87 The mother consented, but the natural father,
U., opposed the petition. 8 8 Before and during the marriage, U. had
committed several juvenile and criminal offenses, some of which were
drug-related. 89 As a result, U. had been incarcerated a number of
times, his longest period of confinement being three years. 9 0 After
his release, U. had been employed as "the successful operator of a
parking lot" and had deposited twenty dollars a week for three years
in a bank account for the support of his children. 9 l In order to determine whether U.'s conduct was sufficient to justify termination,

78 See notes 188-219 infra and accompanying text.
79 61 N.J. 89, 293 A.2d 171 (1972).
80 Id. at 94-95, 293 A.2d at 173.
81

N.J.

82

KETCHAM

STAT. ANN.

&

§ 9:3-48(c)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
supra note 48, at 539.

BABCOCK,

1 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-48(c)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); see
supra note 48, at 539.
84 KETCHAM & BABCOCK, supra note 48, at 539.
85 61 N.J. at 92, 293 A.2d at 172.
86

Id.

87

Id. at 96-97, 293 A.2d at 174-75.

88 Id.
89 Id.

at 96, 293 A.2d at 174.
at 97, 293 A.2d at 175.
at 96, 293 A.2d at 174.

90 1d.
91 id. at 97, 293 A.2d at 175.

KETCHAM

&

BABCOCK,
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the court stated that forsaken parental obligations "require[s] a past
course of conduct anounting to intended abandonment or very substantial neglect of both parental duties and claims, with no reasonable
expectation of any reversal of that conduct in the near future." 92
Upon the facts of the case, the court held that the requirement of'
present unfitness had not been met, and the court therefore refused
to terminate U.'s parental rights to his children. 93 As to the dispositional stage, the court addressed the issue of whether the best interests of the child could be intertwined with those interests concerned with parental unfitness.9 4 The court concluded that the best
interests of the child could only be considered after valid grounds for
termination had been found. 95
Neither the courts nor the legislature have described the dispositional stage in the same exacting manner accorded the jurisdictional
stage. For example, with respect to the jurisdictional question, the
legislature, in the recently repealed adoption-termination statute,
provided that there must be "forsaken parental obligations." 96 This
terminology was specifically defined by that statute. 9 7 The new
adoption-termination statute further demonstrates this emphasis on
jurisdiction since it incorporates the supreme court's interpretation of
the former statute's definition of forsaken parental obligations, although not using the words forsaken parental obligations. 9 8 The on-ly

92 Id.at 94-95, 293 A.2d at 173. Prior to In re Adoption of Children by D., the present
fitness of the parents was considered in the dispositional stage as a factor in determining the
child's best interests. It was not part of the jurisdictional questions. The judicial interpretation
given to "abandonment" in the seminal decision of Winans v. Luppie, 47 N.J. Eq. 302, 20 A.
969 (Ct. Err. & App. 1890), allowed abandonment to be repented of, but only if it was in the
best interests of the child. Id. at 304-05, 20 A. at 970. Winans demonstrated that present

parental unfitness was considered in the dispositional stage. See id. at 305, 20 A. at 970. The
supreme court, in In re Adoption of Children by D., modified the jurisdictional requirements
by augmenting the statutory definition of forsaken parental obligations. 61 N.J. at 94-95, 293
A.2d at 173. Instead of being simply conduct which demonstrates a relinquishment of all duties
toward the child, the new requirement of "no reasonable expectation of any reversal of that
conduct in the near future" was added to the statutorv definition. Id.
93 Id. at 98-99, 293 A.2d at 175-76.
94 Id. at 95, 293 A.2d at 174.
95 Id. The traditional preference for the parental rights approach was again impliedly upheld
through the court's specific refusal to consider the best interests of the child until having
acknowledged jurisdiction. Id.
96 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-24(c) (West 1976).
9' Id. § 9:3-18(d).
98 Compare In re Adoption of Children by D., 61 N.J. 89, 92, 293 A.2d 171, 173 (1972)
(defining forsaken parental obligations as "a past course of conduct amounting to intended abandonment or very substantial neglect of both parental duties and claims, with no reasonable
expectation of any reversal of that conduct in the near future") with N.J. STrAT. ANN. § 9:34
8(c)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (defining the standard for termination as "intentional
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statutory limitation as to the dispositional stage, however, is "that the
best interests of the child would be promoted by the adoption." 99
Further statutory elucidation of this standard is absent. 10 0 In light of
In re Adoption of Children by D., it appears that the statutory stan-

dard adopted from this formulation facilitates the court's approach to
the jurisdictional question. 10 l The absence of any definitive statutory
guidelines, coupled with the inherent vagueness of the concept of
best interests of the child, has resulted in the use of a variety of
factors to discover best interest, none of which have assumed a dom-

inant role. The most commonly considered factors include: the
character, condition, habits and other surroundings of the claimant;
the difference in social standing between the parties; the inequality of
fitness between the natural and adopting parents; blood ties, if any,
between the child and the adopting parents; the improved health of
the child since placement in the custody of the adopting parents; and
the development of psychological parenthood.10 2 The result of this
approach has been the judicial juggling of a combination of any
10 3
number of the above considerations.
Although the highest court of New Jersey had approved the use
of the psychological parenthood factor in earlier decisions,104 this conabandonment or very substantial neglect of parental duties without a reasonable expectation of a
reversal of that conduct in the future").
99 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-27(c) (West 1976).
100 The adoption act provides no definition for "'best interests." See id. § 9:3-18.
101 See notes 85-93 supra and accompanying text.
'o' See Comment, Adoption: Psychological Parenthood as the Controlling Facts in Determining the Best Interests of the Child, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 693, 694 (1973).
103 In the following cases, best interests factors were balanced: Lavigne v. Family & Children's Soc'v of Elizabeth, 11 N.J. 473, 478-79, 482-83, 95 A.2d 6, 8-9, 11 (1953) (inequality of
fitness between natural and adopting parents and psychological parenthood); In re A.B.M., 132
N.J.. Eq. 434, 434-41, 28 A.2d 518, 519-22 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942)"(inequality of fitness between natural and adopting parents and psychological parenthood); Winans v. Luppie, 47 N.J.
Eq. 302, 305-06, 20 A. 969, 969-70 (Ct. Err. & App. 1890) (difference in social standing between the parties and psychological parenthood); Richards v. Collins, 45 N.J. Eq. 283, 287-88,
17 A. 831, 832-33 (Ct. Err. & App. 1889) (character, condition, habits and other surroundings
of claimant and psychological parenthood); In re P., 114 N.J. Super. 584, 592-95, 277 A.2d 566,
570-72 (App. Div. 1971) (psychological parenthood and inequality of fitness between natural and
adopting parents, but decided solely on psychological parenthood); In re Adoption by J.B. &
F.B., 63 N.J. Super. 98, 105-06, 164 A.2d 65, 85-89 (App. Div. 1960) (inequality of fitness
between natural and adopting parents and psychological parenthood); In re Jacques, 48 N.J.
Super. 523, 528-33, 138 A.2d 581, 584-86 (Ch. Div. 1958) (inequality of fitness between natural
and adopting parents, blood ties between child and adopting parents and psychological parenthood); In re D., 78 N.J. Super. 117, 125-27, 187 A.2d 628, 632-33 (Union County Ct., Prob.
Div. 1963) (inequality of fitness between natural and adopting parents, improved health of child
since in custody of adopting parents and psychological parenthood).
104 E.g., Lavigne v. Family & Children's Soc'y of Elizabeth, 11 N.J. 473, 478-79, 482-83, 95
A.2d 6, 8-9, 11 (1953). See also note 103 supra.
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sideration was not used by the court as the sole factor in determining
disposition until its decision in Sorentino. 105 Prior to Sorentino,
however, the appellate court had used that factor exclusively in reaching a decision upon termination. In In re P.,1 0 6 the mother had surrendered her child to the adopting parents four days after its illegitimate birth. 10 7 Two months later, just before marrying the natural
father, the mother requested the child's return. 10 8 Answering the
jurisdictional question, the appellate division initially held that there
had been an abandonment. 1 0 9 With regard to the dispositional question, the court held that although both the natural and adopting parents were equally fit, 1 10 the best interests of the child required that
the adopting parents keep the child."' The court based its determination of the dispositional question entirely on psychological parenthood, i.e., on the emotional ties which had developed between the
child and the adopting parents during the two-year period that had
elapsed since the surrender of custody. 1 12 The court also indicated
that even in the first few months following surrender, a sufficient
psychological relationship could possibly develop, which could war113
rant retention of custody by the foster parents.
In re P. is indicative of a revolution taking place with respect to
the rights of parents and children. 114 The movement advocates an
increased recognition of the rights of the child, and runs counter to
the traditional emphasis on parental rights." 5 Parens patriae, when
coupled with this movement, is virtually an unlimited source of
power for any court that wishes to utilize it, and can provide the
116
energy for new inroads into the established parental rights theory.
In Sees v. Baber this synthesis is demonstrably evident in the supreme court's dicta which advocated the unprecedented avoidance of
the jurisdictional-dispositional procedure in a case factually similar to
Sorentino. 117

10s
106

See notes 188-264 infra and accompanying text.
114 N.J. Super. 584, 277 A.2d 566 (App. Div. 1971).

Id.
Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
1 Id.
,,2 Id.
107

108

113

114
115

116
117

at
at
at
at
at
at

587, 277 A.2d at
587, 277 A.2d at
591-92, 277 A.2d
592-93, 277 A.2d
593-95, 277 A.2d
595, 277 A.2d at

567.
568.
at 570.
at 570-71.
at 570-72.
572.

Id.
See Simpson, supra note 48, at 348-49.
Id.
See 74 N.J. at 221, 377 A.2d at 638.
See id.
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PARENS PATRIAE AS AN ALTERNATIVE STANDARD
FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

Parens patriae, the equitable power of the state to protect children and act in their welfare according to their best interests, has
been recognized in Anglo-American law for almost three centuries. 118 Although numerous attempts have been made to determine the source of this jurisdiction, its origin remains obscure.

1 19

118 2 J. STORY, EQUITY § 1332, at 760-62 (5th ed. 1849). Story suggests that the first exercise
of this jurisdiction was in 1696. Id.
19 Id. § 1328, at 758. It has been suggested_ that parens patriae originated from the King's
duty to protect and defend his loyal subjects, particularly those subjects who could not
adequately care for themselves. Id. The King was said to act as parens patriae, the patriarchal
first parent of the realm, Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 4 Eng. Rep. 659, 664 (Ch. 1722), on behalf of
idiots, lunatics and infants without guardians. 2 J. STORY, supra note 118, § 1328, at 758-59.
Upon the grant of the Great Seal to the Chancellor which created the Court of Chancery, the
royal parens patriae prerogative was transferred to the Chancellor as a branch of the general
equitable jurisdiction of the court. 2 J. FONBLANQUE, A TREATISE OF EQUITY 228 n.a (1795).
The validity of this theory has been questioned, however, since the Chancellor's power to deal
with lunatics and idiots arose from a specific delegation of authority by the King to the Chancellor. Id. The criticisms arose, that given the King's original power, there would be no specific
need for a later grant of authority to the Chancellor vis d vis lunatics and idiots. Id. From this,
it was inferred that neither did the power over infants vest originally in the King. Id. However,
this is explained by the fact that the power over lunatics and idiots originally vested in the
feudal lords, thus requiring a parliamentary act to invest the King with the power. Id.
Another explanation attempts to derive the power from the law of trusts. Duke of Beaufort
v. Berty, 24 Eng. Rep. 579, 579 (Ch. 1721). Since the Court of Chancery had the general
power and jurisdiction over all trusts, it was argued that the guardian relationship must have
also stemmed from that jurisdiction. Id. It has been" contended that the relationship between
parent and child is that of a trustee and a trust res. Rossman, Parens Patriae, 4 ORE. L. REv.
233, 236 (1925). But analogizing guardianship to a trust relationship has been criticized since
trusts are applied to property and not to persons. 2 J. FONBLANQUE, supra at 228 n.a.
A third explanation places the power initially in the Court of Chancery and then in the
Court of Wards and Liveries upon its establishment. Smith v. Smith, 26 Eng. Rep. 977, 977
(K.B. 1745); Morgan v. Dillon, 88 Eng. Rep. 361, 364 (Ch. 1724); Falkland v. Berty, 23 Eng.
Rep. 814, 818 (Ch. 1696); 2 J. FONBLANQUE, supra at 228 n.a; 2 J. STORY, supra note 118, §
1332, at 760-61. After the Court of Wards and Liveries was abolished, this theory continues,
the power was returned to Chancery. Id. A variation of this theory traces the power initially to
the Court of Wards and Liveries and upon its termination to Chancery. 2 J. FONBLANQUE,
supra at 228 n.a. In any event, neither explanation substantiates the proposition that the parens
patriae power originated in Chancery. See 2 J. STORY, supra § 1332, at 760-61. Furthermore,
since the Court of Wards and Liveries' jurisdiction extended only to infants with property, 2 J.
FONBLANQUE, supra at 228 n.a, Chancery's general jurisdiction with regard to infants could not
be derived therefrom. Id.
Another prominent theorist claims that the power was simply usurped by tle Chancellor in
1696. Id. At that time, the Chancellor appointed a guardian on petition without bill for the first
time. Id. Thereafter, the exercise of this power was accepted. Id. It is highly unlikely, however,
that as late as 1696 such an usurpation would be either claimed by the Chancellor or tolerated
by Parliament. 2 J. STORY, supra § 1332, at 762 n.1.
The ancient common law writs of Ravishment of Ward and De Recto We Custodia have also
been suggested as the origin of the jurisdiction. See 2 J. FONBLANQUE, supra at 228 n.a. How-
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Probably the most credible account of this power is that since such a
power existed in every civilized state, it is reasonable to assume that
120
the power is inherent in the sovereign.
In New Jersey, the parens patriae power was first exercised by
the court of chancery in 1868.121 Upon the merger of law and
equity, jurisdiction passed to the superior court. 122 The jurisdiction
exists in pari passu with, and does not depend upon statute. 123 Although it is clear that the power is greater than specific statutory
grants of authority, 12 4 the limits of the power have never been determined. 12 5 The application of parens patriae to determine the
status of a child according to the best interests and welfare will be
analyzed with respect to the established custody and termination
standards outlined above. Consideration of New Jersey case law, including Sorentino and Sees, suggest that parens patriae may be a sole
1 26
basis for termination independent of statutory restrictions.
The interpretation of parens patriae has varied according to the
definition of what constitutes the child's welfare. In the custody context, one standard prevails with respect to divorced or separated parents.1 27 In custody disputes between divorced or separated parents,
ever, these writs were law remedies, not equitable remedies. Id. Also, they only applied to
contending competitors to a right of guardianship and not to a general all-inclusive authority to
act in the best interests of the infant. Id.
The last prominent theory traces parens patriae back to the inquisitio post mnorten, abuses
of which caused the Court of Wards and Liveries to be established. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 332, at 1836 (W. Jones ed. 1916). Blackstone indi-

cates that when the male heir reached twenty-one or the female heir sixteen, they could seek
the return of their lands from their guardian. But in order to do this, a fine consisting of
one-half of the year's profit from the land, had to be paid. No heir was excused payment of the
fine. This payment was viewed as a consideration for the protection afforded the ward. In order
for the King to ascertain how much he was owed and to make certain that the heir would get
his property, a system of traveling judges was used. These judges, called justices in evre or
itinerant justices, made inquiries upon the death of any man of fortune. This inquisitio post
moortem established the value of the estate, the type of tenure and the name and age of the

heir. But the inquisition became so corrupt that Henry VIII was forced to establish the Court of
Wards and Liveries. Id. Thus, this theory considers the inquisition the origin of Chancery's
general power to deal with infants. However, since the inquisition's jurisdiction was limited to
infants with property as was the Court of Wards and Liveries, this theory is also unacceptable.
Id.
120 2 J. FONBLANQUE, supra note 119, at 228 n.a.
121 See Baird v. Baird, 19 N.J. Eq. 481, 485 (Ct. Err. & App. 1868).
122 Henderson v. Henderson, 10 N.J. 390, 395, 91 A.2d 747, 749-50 (1952). The superior
court succeeded to the power of the former court of chancery by virtue of Article XI, section
IV, paragraph 3 of the New Jersey Constitution of 1947. See 10 N.J. at 395, 91 A.2d at 750.
123 In re Erving, 109 N.J. Eq. 294, 297, 157 A. 161, 163 (Ch. 1931).
124
125

12
127

Id.
In re Lippincott, 96 N.J. Eq. 260, 261-62, 124 A. 532, 533 (Ch. 1924).
See notes 188-264 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 128-30 infra and accompanying text.
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it is the general rule in New Jersey that the best interests of the child
is of paramount consideration. 128 Underlying the best interests rule
is the principle that neither "parent ha[s] a prima facie right to the
child's custody." 129 Instead, courts are required to exercise their
discretion based upon considerations of the child's welfare. 130 By
contrast, two different standards apply in parent-stranger custody disputes. Such situations present a more distinct separation of parentoriented arid child-oriented factors.. 1 31 In this context, two opposing
views have emerged: the parental rights approach and the best in13 2
terests approach.
The "blood is thicker than water" rationale, which can be
equated with King Solomon's famous custody decision, provided the
basis of the parental rights standard. 13 3 Under the parental rights
test, the parent will retain custody unless shown to be unfit. 1 34 In
all jurisdictions, unfitness can be shown by proving that the natural
parent has abandoned the child, that the natural parent is of an undesirable moral character, or that the home environment of the natural
parent is not proper.' 3 5 This view derives from the belief that the
parent's interests will reflect those of the child except in extraordinary
circumstances. 136 The justification for this approach is the belief that
in a functional family the parents are entitled to the custody and control of their children. 1 3 7 In most situations, this standard is based
128English

v. English, 32 N.J. Eq. 738, 742-43 (Ct. Err. & App. 1880). It should be noted

that this approach is universally accepted in the custody contest. Simpson, supra note 48, at

356.
This best interests rule developed out of early cases in which the father was deemed always
entitled to the custody of his child absent a showing of parental unfitness. E.g., State v. Stigall,

22 N.J.L. 286, 287-89 (Sup. Ct. 1849). The mother was only entitled to custodv if the child
were of "tender years," absent such parental misconduct. Id. at 289. Later, it was established

that both father and mother had equal rights to the child and, consequently, the best interests
of the child would determine the grant of custody. E.g., Clemens v. Clemens, 20 N.J. Super.
383, 390-91, 90 A.2d 72, 75-76 (App. Div. 1952).
129 Note, Measuring the Child's Best Interests-A Study of Incomplete Considerations, 44
DEN. L.J. 132, 133 (1967).
130 Id.
131 H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 17.5; Simpson, supra note 48, at 357-58; Note, Alternatives to
"ParentalRight" in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151, 152-53
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Alternatives].
132 H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 17.5.
133 Foster, Adoption and Child Custody: Best Interests of the Child, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 1,
1 (1973). King Solomon's decision was based on the "superiority" of the natural parent. Thus,
the woman who cried out to prevent the death of the child had to be the mother because her
love for the child was greater. See I KINGs 3:16-28.
134 Simpson, supra note 48, at 357.
3' See Alternatives, supra note 131, at 153.

136 Id. at 155.
137 H. CLARK,

supra note 1, § 17.5.
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upon two assumptions: parents, "with all their faults," are more capable of providing "for their children than strangers or agencies of the
state;" and, the emotional ties with the biological parent are even
more important than the greater material benefits and care which
13 8
could be provided by foster or adoptive parents.
The parental rights approach provides an easy solution for judges
unwilling to weigh the relevant, albeit complicated, factors inherent
in a proper custody decision. 1 39 In addition, the parental rights
theory is compatible with the human and judicial tendency to
stereotype relationships. 140 As a result, judges have traditionally preferred to use the parental rights approach with its relatively clear
standards for the trier of fact to the amorphous best interests ap14 1
proach.
The best interests standard, like the parental rights approach, is
also based upon considerations of the welfare of the child. 142 Theoretically, however, parental unfitness is not the sine qua non of granting custody to a stranger. 143 Thus, even if a parent were not found
to be unfit, custody could be awarded to a non-parent if mandated by
the best interests of the child. 144 In determining best interests, the
courts consider numerous factors: the "moral fitness of the . .. parties;" the home environment of each party; "the emotional ties of the
child to the parties and of the parties to the child; the age, sex and
health of the child;" whether it would be desirable to continue the
present relationship with the third party; and finally, the child's pref145
erence.
This approach has been criticized because of' its indeterminate naturo which allows selective and subjective application of the numer138Id.An exception to the parental rights approach developed in many jurisdictions allowing
that, if a parent voluntarily gives up a child to a stranger and a strong relationship develops

between the child and the stranger, the court will not dissolve this relationship and return the
child to the parent. Simpson, supra note 48, at 357-58. The criteria for such a decision are:
"the length of stay" with the third party; "the nature of [the] . . . relationship . . . ; the degree

of contact maintained with the parent;" and, whether or not the parent intended the stay to be
temporary or permanent. H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 17.5, at 594. The use of the latter fact has
been criticized in casts where the temporary nature of the stay is determinative because "the
child begins to resemble a chattel, title to which remains in the parent even though possession
may be transferred." Id.
139 Foster, supra note 133, at 3.
140 id. at 2.
141 Alternatives, supra note 131, at 153-55.

142Id. at 155-56. It is obvious that all courts base their decisions on the welfare of the child.
However, the difficulty lies in the definition of the best interests of the child.
143 See H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 17.5.
144 Alternatives, supra note 131, at 156 n.24.
145 Id. at 153.
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To escape the criticism that this test is but a disguise

under which bare "judicial intuition" operates, most courts use
various procedural devices which tend to favor the natural parent in
obtaining custody. 14 7 An example of such a device is the limited
presumption that custody by the natural parent will be in the best
interests of the child. 14 8 Such efforts have, in fact, turned the best
14 9
interests test into a disguised form of the parental rights theory.
Thus, although best interests language is present in many custody
cases, the parental rights theory is actually applied through the use of
procedural devices in most parent-stranger custody contests. 150
Thus, in most cases the application of the best interests and parental
rights theories have yielded the same result.' 5 ' This is clearly the
dilemma in New Jersey where custody had never been awarded to a
stranger absent parental unfitness until the 1977 decision of Sorentino
v. Family & Children's Society of Elizabeth. 152
14 Id. at 153-54.
147 Id. at 154.
148 Id. at 154-55.

149 Id. at 154 & n.18. Contra, H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 17.5.
150 Alternatives, supra note 131, at 154 & n.18.
...See In re Mrs. M., 74 N.J. Super. 178, 181 A.2d 14 (App. Div. 1962). In re Mrs. M. is a
perfect example of a court using best interest language but actually applying the parental preference standard. The court stated the rule that the welfare of the child is the essential factor
and that even parental rights must be subordinated to the best interest of the child. Id. at 183,
181 A.2d at 16. Nevertheless, the court refused to award custody of the child to a third party
who had retained custody for over 14 months solely because the parent was not deemed to be
unfit. Id. at 187-90, 181 A.2d at 18-20. The court completely ignored whether taking a
twenty-eight month old child away from the third party would be in the child's best interests.
See id. Thus, although best interests language was present in the case, the true determnining
factor was parental unfitness. Id. at 187, 181 A.2d at 18.
152 S.M. v. S.J:, 143 N.J. Super. 379, 385, 363 A.2d 353, 356 (Ch. Div. 1976); see 74 N.J. at
320, 326-27, 378 A.2d 21, 24-25. As to the present criteria for awarding custody in parentstranger situations, see the discussion of the Sorentino decisions in notes 151-240 infra and
accompanying text.
Although many New Jersey decisions used best interests language, all custody decisions
prior to Sorentino II were decided strictly on parental rights. The first important custody case
for purposes of this discussion was Richards v. Collins, 45 N.J. Eq. 283, 17 A. 831 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1889). In Richards, the mother gave her child to an aunt, and after many years, sought
the return of the child. Id. at 288-89, 17 A. at 832-33. The court noted 'ts authority to consider
the welfare of the child paramount to the legal rights of the parents in certain circumstances.
Id. at 286-87, 17 A. at 832. Nevertheless, the Richards court emphasized the mother's abandonment in granting custody to the child's aunt. See id. at 288-89, 17 A. at 832-33. Thus,
although the court considered the welfare of the child to be the controlling factor, the case can
also be interpreted as a parental rights decision. See id. at 285-89, 17 A. at 832-33.
The judicial reaction to Richards in Gitln v. Gascoigne, 60 N.J. Eq. 256, 47 A. 25 (Ch.
1900), demonstrated a refusal to accept Richards' broad best interests language. In Giffin, the
father gave custody of his child to an aunt. Subsequently, the child was transferred to his
grandfather who refused to return the child. Id. at 257, 262, 47 A. at 25, 27. The court held
that only if a parent is unfit may custody be awarded to a third party. Id. at 260, 47 A. at
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In New Jersey, the application of parens patriae to the termination of parental rights has reflected the same parental preference ap-

26-27. With respect to Richards' best interests language, the court narrowly interpreted such
language to mean relative material benefits: "'Such a view would take his child from the poor
man and give it to his richer neighbor who might offer to adopt it." Id. at 259, 47 A. at 26. This
clear parental rights approach in Giffin formed the basis of the decision in Hesselman v. Haas,
71 N.J. Eq. 689, 64 A. 165 (Ch. 1906). In Hesselman, the mother had given away her child at
its birth, id. at 691, 64 A. at 166, and sought its return, ten years later. See id. at 696, 64 A. at
168. The court granted custody to the mother, finding that she had not completely abandoned
the child. The court did not consider effects upon the child in being taken away from the couple
after ten years. See id. at 695-97, 64 A. at 167-68. Subsequently, in Ziezel v. Hutchinson, 91
N.J. Eq. 325, 100 A. 300 (Ct. Err. & App. 1920), the court of errors and appeals utilized the
reasoning of Hesselman. In Ziezel, the mother died in childbirth and the father gave the child to
the maternal grandparents. After three years, the father wanted the child back. Id. at 325-26,
100 A. at 300. The court clearly applied the parental preference standard, holding that since the
father was not unfit, custody must be granted to him. Id. at 328, 100 A. at 301. Another case
also characterized by parental rights language is Ex parte Kirschner, 111 A. 737 (N.J. Ch. 1920).
In Kirschner, the court noted that New Jersey law had "repudiate[d] the theory that" the
custody of children should be determined "according to the view which officials of the state take
as to what is for the best interests of the children." Id. at 738.
In cases subsequent to Richards v. Collins, best interest language continued to be mentioned in spite of the definite parental rights approach which was taken. For example, in Corsi
v. State Board of Children's Guardians, 96 N.J. Eq. 254, 124 A. 609 (Ch. 1924), the best
interests language was quoted in full from Richards. Nevertheless, the case was decided on the
issue of abandonment and parental unfitness. Id. at 257-58, 124 A. at 610-11.
It must be noted that although the courts continued to use best interests language in
making parental rights decisions, the superficial use of such language began to be more dominant in the late 1930s. To be sure, this trend can be considered one of mere form and not
substance, but it can also be said to signal an extremely gradual change in the attitude of the
courts. See S.M. v. S.J., 143 N.J. Super. 379, 384-85, 363 A.2d 353, 355-56 (Ch. Div. 1976).
The result in Sorentino II can be partially traced to this tendency to speak in terms of best
interests. One of the first cases of this trend was In re A.B.M., 132 N.J. Eq. 434, 28 A.2d 518
(Ct. Err. & App. 1942). In that case, while basing its holding on a finding of abandonment, the
court stated: "Our law is clear on the subject. It is not the parental right but the interest of the
child which is controlling." Id. at 441, 442, 28 A.2d at 522. In re A.B.Al. was followed by In re
R.L., 137 N.J. Eq. 271, 44 A.2d 396 (Ch. 1945), which provided an excellent statement of best
interests principles: "A child cannot be regarded in the law as a mere inanimate chattel. The
rights of the parent must not be permitted to obliterate the rights of the child." Id. at 275, 44
A.2d at 398. See also Starr v. Gorman, 136 N.J. Eq. 105, 107-08, 40 A.2d 564, 565-66 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1945) (welfare of the child controlling element); Baum v. Kornberg, 139 N.J. Eq. 265,
269, 50 A.2d 844, 846 (Ct. Err. & App. 1947) (the interest of the child and not the parental
right is controlling).
In In re Alsdorf, 142 N.J. Eq. 246, 59 A.2d 610 (Ch. 1948), the court attempted to make a
synthesis of prior custody decisions. The older cases such as Giffin and Ziezel were denominated parental rights cases, and cases beginning with In re A.B.M. were considered to represent the cases emphasizing best interests of the child rather than parental rights. Id. at 253, 59
A.2d at 614-15. Subsequent cases follow Alsdorf in stressing the child's welfare. See, e.g.,
Scanlon v. Scanlon, 29 N.J. Super. 317, 325, 102 A,2d 656, 661 (App. Div. 1954) ("[w]here
circumstances of weight and importance concerning the welfare of the infant transcend the strict
legal rights of the parents, the court may award the custody of the infant to a stranger"); In re
S., 57 N.J. Super. 154, 156, 154 A.2d 129, 130 (Essex County Ct. 1959) ("[p]rimarv and controlling issue .. . [is] ... welfare and best interests of the infant involved"); In re Mrs. M., 74
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proach as present in the custody area. 153 Although all termination
decisions claim to be rooted in the best interests and welfare of the
child, it is clear that the statutory framework has been interpreted to
favor retention of custody by natural parents. 154 Traditionally, this
result has arisen from the creation of a jurisdictional-dispositional procedure in termination proceedings under the adoption-termination
approach which, until recently, represented the great bulk of
cases. 1 55 It is apparent that since the best interests of the child are.
not considered until the court's jurisdiction has been established, the
jurisdictional-dispositional approach does not inherently favor the best
interests of the child. 156 For parens patriae to constitute an effective
N.J. Super. 178, 183, 181 A.2d 14, 16 (App. Div. 1962) ("welfare of the child is the controlling
consideration . . . [to which] [e]ven parental rights must yield").
The modern trend of classifying custody decisions in terms of the welfare of the child was
remarked upon in S.M. v. S.J., 143 N.J. Super. 379, 363 A.2d 353 (Ch. Div. 1976). This
decision clearly recognized that, in New Jersey, custody of a child had never been granted to a
stranger absent "support of one of the parents or a finding of unfitness or abandonment." Id. at
385, 363 A.2d at 356. In S.M., the mother of an illegitimate child married a man shortly after
the child's birth who was not the child's father. Id. at 382, 363 A.2d at 354. The husband and
wife lived together for over seven years and during that time had two children. Id. Upon
separation, the mother took custody for over a year and then gave all of the children to her
husband who, at the time of the decision, had retained custody for over two years. Id. Upon
the mother's attempt to secure the return of her illegitimate child, the court ruled in favor of
the husband, granting him custody based upon the child's best interests. Id. at 385-86, 363
A.2d at 356. Although S.M. can be construed as giving a child to a stranger in the absence of
parental unfitness, it is clear that the particular facts of the case demonstrate that the husband
was not really a stranger. See id. at 382, 363 A.2d at 354. S.M. is analogous to a divorce or
separation situation in which both parents have equal rights to the children and best interests
control. See notes 128-30 supra and accompanying text. Thus, although the S.M. court characterized its decision as the first granting of custody to a stranger absent parental unfitness, see
143 N.J. Super. at 381, 363 A.2d at 354, the case is actually distinguishable in that the husband
was truly not a stranger. Rather, Sorentino II is the first case in which a stranger has been
awarded custody absent parental unfitness. See text accompanying notes 223-25 infra.
153 The termination of parental rights almost exclusively arises in adoption proceedings. In a
divorce or separation situation, it is rarely the case that either spouse will press to terminate the
rights of the other since termination is seldom granted in such cases. See 74 N.J. at 322-23, 378
A.2d at 22-23. Therefore, discussion of parens patriae as applied to termination proceedings
between husband and wife is not meaningful.
154 See note 152 supra. This is the rule not only in New Jersey, but in all other jurisdictions.
Simpson, supra note 48, at 380-81.
155 Ketcham & Babcock, supra note 48, at 539-41.
156 Id. at 539-40. A good example of the method by which the jurisdictional-dispositional
approach can prevent consideration of the child's welfare is presented in the Oregon case of
State v. McMaster, 259 Ore. 291, 486 P.2d 567 (1971). In that case, a two-month old illegitimate child was taken from her mother on charges of neglect. Id. at 301, 486 P.2d at 572. When
the child was four years old the natural parents contested the suit for termination by the foster
parents. Id. at 303, 486 P.2d at 572. The Supreme Court of Oregon held that the actions of the
mother were. not serious enough to justify termination. See id. at 303-04, 486 P.2d at 572-73.
For a discussion of this case in the context of the jurisdictional-dispositional approach and
psychological parenthood, see Ketcham & Babcock, supra note 48, at 538-42.
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approach to the termination of parental rights it is necessary to demonstrate that it avoids the problems inherent in the two stage
"jurisdictional-dispositional procedure." Furthermore, the best interests of the child test and the psychological parentage approach
must provide a clear, dependable and judicially manageable set of
criteria for evaluation of any particular case. 157 Therefore, "best interests" must be "broken up into more specific and concrete elements
stressing the child's psychological welfare." 158 If this is not done,
the courts will revert to such convenient generalizations as "'a natural
parent is to be preferred over a stranger,' or "'a mother is to be
preferred over a father"' or "'the non-custodial parent should be
given . . . visitation rights.'"159 While these "rules of thumb" may
be correct in many cases as the natural parents are usually the
psychological parents, the basic thrust of the theory of psychological
parenthood, however, is that such rules should not be applied automatically since the natural parents may lose, or never achieve,
160
psychological parent status.
The results of various behavioral studies which outline the manner in which psychological parenthood can be an accurate measure for
termination will now be presented. These provide a basis for direct
judicial acceptance of parens patriae as an independent basis for termination of parental rights requiring only an examination of the best
interests, i.e., psychological welfare, of the child.
The basis of psychological parenthood is the mutual interaction
between the adult and the child. 16 1 The belief in the blood relationship which forms the basis of pre-Sorentino decisions overlooked the
child's method of structuring relationships. 162 The essential element
of successful personality development is not the biological occurrence
which initiated the relationship, but the psychological relationship
existing between the adult and the child.1 63 Although the biological
parent's opportunity to establish such a relationship is great, this advantage may be lost when a third party has had custody of the child
157 If psychological parenthood is to be the determining factor in terminating parental rights,
there must be "criteria predictive of the formation and growth of psychological and emotional
ties that can be employed in order to evaluate the effects of removing a child from the
psychological home." Comment, supra note 102, at 693, 702.
158 Foster, supra note 133, at 3.
159 Id.
"' See notes 161-68 infra and accompanying text.
161 J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 77, at 19. Professor Goldstein contends that such a role cannot
be filled "by an absent, inactive adult, whatever his biological . . . relationship to the child.
Id.
162 See id. at 31-39.

163 Id.

at 16-20.
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for a period of time.1 64 The child begins to view the third party as
its psychological parent after some period of separation from the
biological parent, and, after a period of time, the psychological
relationship with the biological parent begins to weaken and is eventually replaced by a psychological relationship with the new custodian. 16 5 Return of the child to the biological parent after establishment of psychological parenthood with a third party will cause severe
harm to the child and can even prevent the child from initiating new
relationships. 1 66 Thus, the "rule of thumb" generalizations presently
used to determine custody and termination 167 may fail to provide for
the child's best interests since they ignore the present psychological
168
relationship existing between the child and the third party.
A real understanding of the dynamics of psychological parenthood requires an anlaysis of what has been termed "the affectionrelationship." 169 The child's "affection-relationship" is the model for
"all future interpersonal relationships." 170 It arises from the "satisfaction by the 'parent' of the child's basic needs" and is firmly established by the end of the first year of infancy. 1 7 1 The separation of a
child from the adult with whom it has had such a relationship has
been deemed "psychologically equivalent ... to the orphaning of
that child." 172 Although the child may form a new "affectionrelationship," it will be of lesser strength.1 73 Once the relationship is
broken, however, return of the child to that adult will not restore the
relationship. This will have a distinct effect on the child's future abil174
ity to establish relationships with others.
The court, in a custody or termination matter, must identify any
presently existing "affection-relationships." 175 Three points of inquiry must be considered: the length of time the relationship has
existed; the affection of the adult for the child; and the affection of
the child for the adult. 176 This inquiry is more complex in those
16 Alternatives, supra note 131, at 158.
16 Id. at 158-59.

166 See J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 77, at 31-34.
167

See notes 159-60 supra and accompanying text.

16sSee J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 77, at 31-39.
169 Alternatives, supra note 131, at 160.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174Id.
175Id.

at 160-61.
at 160.
at 161.
at 160-61.
at 162.

176 Id. The Colorado case of Root v. Allen, 151 Colo. 311, 377 P.2d 117 (1962), provides an
excellent example to demonstrate the applicability and accuracy of psychological parenthood
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situations in which a child has developed more than one "affectionrelationship." 177 Other factors, including the child's recent
developmental state, the child's present emotional needs, the probable trend of future development and the corresponding problems and
178
needs that may arise from this trend must be considered.
Thus, in view of the need of every child for continuous, affectionate and stimulating relationships, the judicial decisions which result in the return of custody to biological parents after a psychological
relationship has developed with a third party are truly not based
upon the best interests of the child. 179 Judicial disposition should,
therefore, not be rendered without providing the decisionmakers with
sufficient data as to the possible psychological consequences of the
decision. 180 Furthermore, in the absence of such data, a presumption should be established in favor of continuing the then current
quasi-parental relationship of the child unless that relationship is but
recently established.181
Procedurally, time is of the utmost importance since the welfare
of the child depends on the length of time he or she has spent with
the foster parents.1 8 2 If a return of the child to the biological parents
theory. The case concerned the custody of Sharon, an eleven year old girl. Id. at 313, 377 P.2d
at 118. Sharon's parents had been divorced in her first year and Rachel, Sharon's mother,
obtained custody at that time. Id. at 312, 377 P.2d at 118. Rachel and Sharon moved to Denver
where Rachel met and, after two years, married Robert Allen. Id. at 313, 377 P.2d at 118.
When Sharon was eight years old, her mother died. Id. at 313, 377 P.2d at 119. The natural
father, William Root, had remarried and established a home in California. Id. at 314, 377 P.2d
at 119. Although Root had seen Sharon for only an hour and a half in the ten years following his
divorce from Rachel, he attempted to regain custody of Sharon after Rachel's death. Id. at 313,
377 P.2d at 118. The Supreme Court of Colorado refused to return custody to Root. Id. at
319-20, 377 P.2d at 122.
Expert testimony at the trial had demonstrated that Sharon was shy, reserved, lacked confidence and, because of her insecurity, relentlessly attempted to establish relationships with
those around her. Id. at 318-19, 377 P.2d at 121. After Rachel's death, Allen was the most
significant adult in Sharon's life. Id. at 319, 377 P.2d at 121. Expert testimony was also introduced to the effect that destruction of Sharon's affection-relationship with Allen would add to
Sharon's lack of confidence and instability. id. at 318, 377 P.2d at 121. The experts agreed that
Sharon would probably establish a new affection-relationship with the Roots, but that such an
affection-relationship would be weak. Id. In addition, Sharon could develop anger toward both
Root and Allen which could lead to various psychological problems. Id. Thus, the quality of
Sharon's affection-relationship with Allen mandated that custody remain with Allen. Id. at 31920, 377 P.2d at 122; Alternatives, supra note 131, at 164.
177 Alternatives, supra note 131, at 166.
178 Id.
179 See J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 77, at 31-34.
180 See Foster, supra note 133, at 3. It has been suggested that custody matters would be
better handled by members of the judiciary with some specialized training in behavioral science. See id.
181 See Goldstein, Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence, 77 YALE L.J. 1053, 1074 (1968).
182Comment, supra note 102, at 709.
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is to be considered, the rehabilitation of these parents must be accomplished rapidly to prevent their loss of status as psychological
parents. In the courts, especially at the appeal level, 183 stich matters
18 4
should be disposed of as quickly as possible.
The distinction between custody and termination discussed above
is largely irrelevant under the principles of psychological parenthood. 185 The harm to the child in removing it from its psychological
environment is the same whether the decision was temporary or
permanent. 186 Once the iemoval continues for some period of time,
agency placement is preferred because of the better opportunity it
affords to avoid the development of an undesirable "affectionrelationship." 187
In conclusion, the parens patriae power to determine the status
of a child according to his or her best interests is a viable -independent standard for termination of parental rights. Since it is not dependent on statutory standards such as forsaken parental obligations,
this power is a potent authority to be exercised in furthering the welfare of the child. In applying this power, courts should be cognizant
of the relative importance of the factors derived from behavioral
studies. These studies also demonstrate the need to develop a termination standard by emphasizing the importance of the child's
psychological well-being to any best interests determination. In light
of this proposal, it would be beneficial to examine the reforms promulgated by the New Jersey supreme court in Sorentino and Sees. It is
through these cases that the possibility of using parens patriae can be
established and the importance of the best interests standard demonstrated.
The Sorentino case involved a sixteen-year-old unmarried mother
who had given birth to a child on May 5, 1974.188 On May 30, 1974,
the child was surrendered to the Family and Children's Society of
Elizabeth for temporary foster care. 18 9 This arrangement was for
thirty days, at the end of which time the mother either could have
taken her child back or surrendered it permanently.' 9 0 After the
thirty days had elapsed, the mother sought the return of her child,
183 Id. at 710.
184

id.

185 Id. at 710-11.
186 Id. at 711.
187 Id. at 711-12.
188 72 N.J. at 129, 367 A.2d at 1169,
' Id. The child's natural father had refused to marry the mother and, as a result, the child's
grandmother would not allow the child and the mother to remain in her home. Id.
190 Id.
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but the agency coerced the mother into surrendering the child. 19 1
Subsequently, the adoptive parents received the child on July 9,
1974.192 After the coerced surrender, the mother repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted to regain custody of her child. 19 3 Although
the natural parents sought legal counsel in early 1975, they were advised not to take further legal action until July of that year.' 9 4 The
trial judge found the Sorentinos to be fit parents and granted them
custody as the natural parents.' 9 5 The appellate division affirmed,
but it stayed the custody order pending appeal, and a further stay
was granted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey pending its own
decision. 19 6 By the time of the court's decision, the natural parents
had married. 197 Furthermore, the child had been in the custody of
the adopting parents for a twenty-nine month period: July 9, 1974, to
December 17, 1976.198
The supreme court held that because the mother had been
coerced by the agency, there had been no forsaken parental obligations.1 99 The court recognized that such a conclusion would normally
result in the child's return to the natural parents. 20 0 Yet, noting its
concern for the "potentiality of serious psychological injury" to the
child based on a possible "drastic change in . . . life circumstances,"
the case was remanded to the trial court with a directive to determine whether such injury would result. 20 1 The court contended
that, by ordering a hearing to determine psychological injury, it was
not "evad[ing] its responsibility as parens patriae of all minor children, to preserve them from harm." 202 The court did, however, retain jurisdiction to allow for review of the trial court's determination
20 3
on remand.

191Id. at 129-30, 376 A.2d at 1169.
192Id. at 128, 367 A.2d at 1169.
193 Id. at 129, 367 A.2d at 1169.
194 Id. at 129-30, 367 A.2d at 1169. The attorney for the natural parents advised them to wait
until the mother reached the age of 18, advice which the supreme court felt was ill-considered.
Id. at 130, 367 A.2d at 1169.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197Id. at 134, 367 A.2d at 1171. It was, however, unclear at what point the marriage took
place. See id.
198 See id. at 127-31, 367 A.2d at 1168-70.
9 Id. at 129-30, 367 A.2d at 1170.
200 Id. at 131, 367 A.2d at 1170.
201Id. at 131-33, 367 A.2d at 1170-71.
202 See id. at 132, 367 A.2d at 1171. The court further noted that "[t]he possibility of serious
psychological harm to the child . . . transcends all other considerations." Id.
203 Id. at 133, 367 A.2d at 1171.
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Before considering the impact of Sorentino, attention must be
given to the New Jersey supreme court's decision in Sees which. was
handed down while Sorentino was on remand. 20 4 Unlike the placement through an agency as in Sorentino, Sees involved a private
placement of a child for adoption. 2 0 5 The child was born to the unmarried mother on July 3, 1976,206 and surrendered to acquaintances
of a physician employed by the hospital in which the baby was
born. 20 7 While in the hospital, the mother signed a surrender form
drafted by the adopting parents' attorney. 20 8 Six days after the birth,
the mother changed her mind and notified the defendants that she
desired the return of her child. The adoptive parents, however, refused to return the child. 20 9 The action for the return of the child
resulted in a supreme court decision rendered on July 27, 1977,210 at
which time the child had been in the custody of the adopting parents
2 11
for one year.
The court found the applicable law to be that parental consent to
surrender a child may be withdrawn in a private placement situation,
whereas consent granted to an approved agency is valid and binding. 21 2 Thus, despite the fact that the mother had executed a consent form, her consent was held to be insufficient under the termination statute. 213 Applying the jurisd.ictional-dispositional test according to the guidelines outlined in In re Adoption of Children by D.,
the court held that since there had been no abandonment, no factors
regarding the child's best interests could be considered.2 14 Thus, the
court ordered that custody be returned to the natural parents. 215 The
204 See 74 N.J. at 201, 377 A.2d at 628. Compare Sees, 74 N.J. at 201, 377 A.2d at 623, with
Sorentino, 72 NJ. at 127, 367 A.2d at 1168 and Sorentino 1!,74 N.J. at 313, 378 A.2d at 18.
205 Id. at 205-07, 377 A.2d at 630-31.
206 id.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.

at
at
at
at
at

204, 377 A.2d at
206-07, 377 A.2d
207, 377 A.2d at
207-08, 377 A.2d
201, 377 A.2d at

630.
at 631.
631.
at 631.
628.

The trial court terminated the natural mother's rights in her child and the appellate division affirmed on January 17, 1977. Id. at 205, 377 A.2d at 630. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey granted the natural mother's petition for certification and motion for acceleration on
March 1, 1977. Sees v. Baber, 74 N.J. 251, 377 A.2d 656 (1977).
211 74 N.J. at 222, 377 A.2d at 639.
212 Id.

at 215, 377 A.2d at 635. The court reasoned that since "no statutory obligation"

existed to the consent, a "retraction" was permissible. Id. The court found further support in
the fact that in most other jurisdictions such a consent was not considered "absolutely irrevocable." id.

213 Id. at 216, 377 A.2d at 636.
214 Id. at 220-21, 377 A.2d at 638.
215 Id. at 221, 377 A.2d at 638.
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court attempted to reconcile this holding with Sorentino due to its
factual similarity, noting that Sorentino was an example of a situation
in "which [a court] might obtrude upon [an] . . . otherwise . . . clear
legal picture in favor of a natural parent" in order to utilize its jurisdiction under the parens patriae power. 2 16 The court, however, distinguished Sorentino from Sees based on the time spent by the child
with the adopting parents. 21 7 While the twenty-nine month period
in Sorentino warranted a hearing to decide potential psychological
harm, the court held that the twelve month period in Sees was not
long enough to require such a psychological inquiry. 2 18 Therefore, a
Sorentino-type hearing on psychological harm was considered un2 19
necessary.
Two months after Sees, the supreme court affirmed the trial
court's decision 220 that psychological injury would result to the
Sorentino child if custody were to be given back to the natural parents. 2 21 The court extensively considered the issue of termination of
parental rights as this appeal was the first supreme court hearing on
the planned adoption by the foster parents. 222 Sorentino was the
first decision in New Jersey in which custody had ever been granted
to a stranger, absent parental unfitness. 2 2 3 Until Sorentino, New
Jersey's best interest approach had always been a disguised parentoriented approach. However, Sorentino clearly represented a custody
decision decided according to a true best interests test. 22 4 It was a
2 25
new exercise of parens patriae in the custody context.
In the custody context, the supreme court's decision after remand (Sorentino II) was simply a reaffirmation of the custody principles enunciated in its earlier opinion. 2 26 With regard to termination,
216

id.

217 Id. at 221-23, 377 A.2d at 638-39.
218 Id. at 221-22, 377 A.2d at 638-39. The court found that an examination of the psychological consequences "would not likely add illumination" to its decision. Id. at 222, 377 A.2d at 639.

Given the child's age, the court concluded "that the nature and duration of such psychological
damage [is] imponderable." Id.
219 Id. at 221, 378 A.2d at 22.
220 74 N.J. at 320, 378 A.2d at 21.
221 Id. at 317, 378 A.2d at 20.
222 Id. at 321, 378 A.2d at 22.
223 See id. at 326-27, 378 A.2d at 24-25. For a discussion of the first case allegedly granting
custody in the absence of parental unfitness, see S.M. v. S.J., 143 N.J. Super. 379, 363 A.2d
353 (Ch. Div. 1976); note 110 supra.
224 See 74 N.J. at 316-20, 378 A.2d at 19-21. See also notes 142-45 supra and accompanying
text.
225 For a discussion of S.M. v. S.J., 143 N.J. Super. 379, 363 A.2d 353 (Ch. Div. 1976), see
note 152 supra.
226 See 74 N.J. at 320, 378 A.2d at 21. The Sorentino 11 court added nothing to the criteria
initially used in Sorentino in determining the grant of custody.
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however, Sorentino II provided extensive guidelines in response to
the defendants' direct petition for adoption.2 2 7 The court indicated
that a primary purpose of the adoption act "is the maintenance of
stable, continuing relationships between parent and child." 228
Nevertheless, this purpose of the act was found inapplicable as there
never had been a relationship between the Sorentinos and their
child. 2 29 In such a case, it was noted, another purpose of the adoption act emerges: the protection of the new family from interference
by parents with whom the child has no continuing relationship, legal
or otherwise. 23 0 The court classified all prior termination proceedings as reflecting either of two purposes: to encourage stable relationships between the natural parents and the child; and where termination was granted, to protect the new family from interference by parents with whom the child had no relationship. 23 1 Applying this
analysis to the Sorentino situation, the court indicated that termination would be proper as there was no existing relationship between
the Sorentinos and their child since the child had been in the custody
23 2
of the adopting parents almost from' birth.
The court then sought to distinguish Sees. 233 Rather than relying upon the parens patriae power to terminate parental rights, absent forsaken parental obligations, where warranted by the child's
best interests, 234 the court attempted to characterize the Sorentinos'
behavior as amounting to forsaken parental obligations. 23 5 Both the
Sorentinos' delay in seeking legal advice and the adopting parents'
lack of any notice of the Sorentinos' change of heart were considered
relevant to "the issue of abandonment and termination." 236 The
court indicated that these facts suggested "strongly ... the conclu2 37
sion that" the Sorentinos had forsaken their parental obligations.
Although, at least superficially, Sorentino II adopts the traditional analysis of termination law, it is doubtful whether the court's
227 Id.
228 Id.
229

at 322-25, 378 A.2d at 22-24.
at 322-23, 378 A.2d at 22.

Id. at 323-24, 378 A.2d at 23.

230 Id. at 323, 378 A.2d at 23.
231

Id. at 323-24, 378 A.2d at 23.

232 Id. at 324-25, 378 A.2d at 23-24. The court reviewed the conduct of the natural parents

in this regard, finding "equivocation and indecision on [their] part" which the court considered
"harmful" to the child's interests. Id. at 324, 378 A.2d at 23.
233 Id. at 325-26, 378 A.2d at 24.
234 See 74 N.J. at 221, 377 A.2d at 638; notes 169-87 supra and accompanying text.
23S Id. at 324, 377 A.2d at 23.
236 Id.
237 id. at 325, 377 A.2d at 24. Due process considerations, however, led the court to remand
the petition for termination to the chancery division. Id.
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findings were sufficient to merit termination under the traditional
standards. One problem arises with respect to the existence of forsaken parental obligations on the part of the Sorentinos. While, initially
the court had impliedly found that there had been no forsaken parental obligations, 2 38 in Sorentino II, the court found it appropriate to
examine the issue due to "a more fully developed record." 2 3 9 There
appears, however, to have been no significant difference in the factual
criteria present in both decisions. 2 40 In addition, the traditional prerequisites for forsaken parental obligations seem to be absent, especially in light of In re Adoption of Children by D. 's requirement of
both past neglect and present inability. 24 1 The facts strongly suggest
that such past neglect and present inability cannot be attributed to
the Sorentinos' conduct. On June 30, 1974, only two days after the
child was surrendered, the father learned of the surrender.2 42 Three
visits to the adoption agency followed in September and December.2 4 3 In January, 1975, legal counsel was sought.2 4 4 Such conduct is not indicative of abandonment and neglect, rather it suggests
prompt resort to available remedies in order to regain custody of the
child. Although the court viewed the adopting parents' ignorance of
the Sorentinos' efforts as relevant to the question of abandonment,
2 45
there was no explanation of this connection.
Another questionable aspect of Sorentino II is the superficiality
with which the court applied the traditional jurisdictional-dispositional
2"8 See 72 N.J. at 130-31, 367 A.2d at 1170; text accompanying note 165 supra. It is evident
from Sorentino that the court had determined that there had been no forsaken parental obligations. In discussing In re Adoption of Children by D., 61 N.J. 89, 293 A.2d 171 (1972), the
court mentioned the rule "that where the parent had not forsaken obligations, the adoption
could not be approved even if in the best interest of the child." 72 N.J. at 131, 367 A.2d at
1170. The court then stated that its conclusions that there had been coercion and thus no
forsaken parental obligations would "[o]rdinarily" indicate "an immediate vesting of custody of
the child in the natural parents." Id. Immediately thereafter, the hearing to determine the
psychological impact on the child was ordered. 72 N.J. at 132, 367 A.2d at 1170. Furthermore,
in Sorentino II, the court admitted "that in Sorentino 1 there was at least an implied determination that there was then no basis for terminating parental rights." 74 N.J. at 322, 378 A.2d at 22
(emphasis in original).
239 74 N.J. at 322, 378 A.2d at 22.
240 Compare 74 N.J. at 316-17, 378 A.2d at 19-20 with 72 N.J. at 129-30, 367 A.2d at
1168-70. After the Sorentino II decision adverted to "a more fully developed record" it proceeded to discuss the purposes of the adoption act, prior termination cases, and the same facts
found in Sorentino. Id. at 322-25, 378 A.2d at 22-25.
241 61 N.J. at 94-95, 293 A.2d at 173. For a discussion of In re Adoption of Children by D.,
see notes 85-101 supra and accompanying text.
242 72 N.J. at 129, 367 A.2d at 1169.
243 Id.

Id.
245 74 N.J. at 324, 378 A.2d at 23. For a discussion of In re Adoption of Children by D., see
244

notes 85-101 supra and accompanying text.
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test.2 4 6 In re Adoption of Children by D. clearly prescribes that the
dispositional standard becomes relevant only after a finding of statutory jurisdiction, that is, a finding adequate to support termination of
parental rights. 24 7 Furthermore, the best interests may not be
considered at the jurisdictional stage. 2 48 In Sorentino II, the finding
of forsaken parental obligations is questionable, 2 49 and even if statutory jurisdiction existed, the court, in direct contrast with In re
Adoption of Children by D., considered best interests as a factor in
the establishment of jurisdiction.2 5 0 The court noted that the natural
parents' actions, upon which the decision to terminate was based,
were "harmful to the well-being of the child and are relevant in the
consideration of the issue of abandonment and termination." 25 1 Use
of such a mild justification, indicates a move away from the traditional
jurisdictional-dispositional approach.
.Eight months earlier, the Sees court had indicated in dicta that
under certain circumstances the jurisdictional-dispositional approach
was not applicable and that Sorentino was an example of such a
case. 2 52 The thrust of the Sees dicta was that parens patriae could
be used to grant custody to adopting parents in situations where prior
law dictated granting of custody to the natural parents.2 5 3 According
to Sees, this result could be based entirely upon an exercise of the
court's parens patriae jurisdiction. 254 It appears, however, that the
court intended to apply the jurisdictional-dispositional approach and
not the Sees dicta.2 5 5 The court was particularly insistent upon
evaluating the factors that could lead to the conclusion that the
Sorentinos had forsaken their parental obligations. 256 Nevertheless,
there is some indication in the opinion that the court may have followed the dicta in Sees. The court's consideration of best interests as

246 See id.

247 61 N.J. at 94-95, 293 A.2d at 173-74.
248 Id.

at 94, 293 A.2d at 174.

249 See notes 238-45 supra and accompanying text.
250 See 74 N.J. at 324, 378 A.2d at 23.
251
252
253
254
255

Id.
74 N.J. at 221, 377 A.2d at 638; see text accompanying note 273supra.
Id.

Id.
See 74 N.J. at 321-26, 378 A.2d at 21-24. See also notes 238-51 supra and accompanying

text.
256 id.

at 324, 378 A.2d at 23. At the conclusion of the opinion in Sorentino II, the court

noted that "the record points strongly to the conclusion that there has been an abandonment."
74 N.J. at 326, 378 A.2d at 24.
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a factor in jurisdiction 25 7 as well as its finding of forsaken parental
258
obligations by the Sorentinos supports this interpretation.
Sorentino II is representative of the reluctance of the New Jersey
supreme court to rely solely upon its parens patriae jurisdiction in
making a custody determination absent the traditional statutory prerequisites. It is clear that the basic faith in the biological family as a
presumptively superior placement for any child which was the policy
basis for all prior New Jersey termination proceedings, 259 was not the
rationale of Sorentino II. It has been shown that, although parens
patiae has been traditionally interpreted only in terms of specific
statutory standards of conduct, 260 it is not coterminous with those

standards. 2 61 Thus, the court has the power to exercise this jurisdiction in all situations where the welfare of the child demands it. Since
the Sorentino court suggested that psychological parenthood alone
could be a sufficient basis for termination 26 2 and since there had
been no contact between the Sorentinos and their child, 2 6 3 the
court's efforts to establish statutory jurisdiction were unnecessary.
The dicta in Sees, suggesting the expanded scope of parens patriae
jurisdiction, 26 4 provides a more efficient and relevant approach to the
type of situation found in Sorentino.
Even, or perhaps especially, in view of the reforms of Sorentino
and Sees, the idea of statutory reform in the termination area seems
attractive. It is, therefore, appropriate to turn now to various types of
statutory reforms impinging on termination which have been proposed and/or enacted.
PROPOSED STATUTORY REFORM

In the past five years, legislators, child advocacy groups, and
academics have given increasing attention to the need for statutory
reform in the area of termination of parental rights. As already indicated, some of this reform could come from judicial exercise of the
inherent parens patriae power over termination, but another effective

257 See 74 N.J. at 324, 378 A.2d at 23.
258 See id.; notes 238-45 supra and accompanying text.

251 See notes 153-56 supra and accompanying text. The principle of biological parenthood
would never allow termination of the natural parents' rights absent some form of severe parental
misconduct. Alternatives, supra note 131, at 157-58.
260 See text accompanying note 83 supra.
261 See text accompanying notes, 123-25 supra.
262 See 74 N.J. at 324-25, 378 A.2d at 23.
263 Id. at 324, 378 A.2d at 23.
264 74 N.J. at 221, 377 A.2d at 638.
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means of securing reform is through the enactment of appropriate
reforming statutes. Thus, it is appropriate to examine some of the
proposed model statutes and the recommendations of two national
commissions in this regard.
The Proposed Model Statutes
The least detailed of the proposed model statutes is the Model
Statute for Termination of Parental Rights (Juvenile Court Judges
Statute) which was prepared by the Neglected Children Committee
of the National Counsel of Juvenile Court Judges under the supervision of Judge James H. Lincoln. 26 5 The primary purpose of this statute is to provide permanence and stability in the child's home situation. 26 6 In addition, a court is directed to give primary consideration
to the physical, mental and emotional condition of the needs of the
child. 267

Various bases for termination of parental rights are provided for
tinder the proposed statute. 2 68 One basis for termination is absolute
abandonment. 26 9 The statute provides that where a child has been
abandoned and the parents fail "to claim the child within three
months" subsequent to "the finding of the child," termination is appropriate. 270 Where the child has not been abandoned, the statute
provides other bases with differing considerations depending on the
child's current status. 2 7 1 In all situations, the court must examine
the fitness of the parents to retain or regain custody of the child, 272
but unlike the traditional statutes, parental fitness is the exclusive
factor only where the child is in the natural parents' custody upon
commencement of the termination proceeding. 2 73

Even in such

cases, the court is directed to consider efforts made by child care
2 74
agencies to rehabilitate the family.

265 NEGLECTED CHILDREN COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE COURT
JUDGES,

MODEL STATUTE FOR TERMINATION

[hereinafter
266 Id. §
267 Id. §
268 Id. §
269 Id. §

OF PARENTAL RIGHTS,

27 Juv. JUST. 3 (1976)

cited as JUVENILE COURT JUDGES STATUTE].

1, at 5.
12(5), at 8.
12, at 7-8.
12(4), at 8.

270 Id. The statute includes within the concept of abandonment "circumstances [under which]
the identity of the parents is unknown and cannot be ascertained despite deligent searching."
Id.
271 See id. § 12(3), at 7-8.
272 See id. § 12, at 7-8.

273 See id. Compare id. § 12(1), at 7 with id. § 12(2), (3), at 7-8.
274 Id. § 12(1) (g), at 7.
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Where the child is not in the home at the time of commencement of the termination proceedings, the court is also required to
examine, inter alia, the failure of the parent to provide care, to maintain regular contact, and to cooperate with the agency in an effort to
improve the welfare of the child. 27 5 Where a child is in foster care,
the court is directed to compare the present conditions in which the
child is living with what his natural parents would be able to provide.27 6 The standards used to make this comparison tend to assume
that the child will be permanently placed with the fostering family so
27 7
to fulfill the child's need for permanence.
The Juvenile Court Judges Statute also attempts to deal with the
procedural problems addressed in Stanley v. Illinois.2 78 It provides
for direct service of process where possible, but makes allowance for
service by publication where a party cannot be located. 279 This latter
provision has been the subject of controversy because publication requires public disclosure of personal information. The statute also provides for notice to all interested parties including not only parents
and guardians, but also persons having temporary custody under
court order or agency placement.2 8 0 The child is also entitled to be
present at the hearing. 2 8 ' The court, however, has discretion to
282
waive the child's appearance in appropriate circumstances.
275 Id. § 12(2), at 7.
276 Id. § 12(3), at 7-8. Factors involved in the comparison include, inter alia:
(a) The love, affection and other emotional ties existing between the child and the
parents, and his ties with the integrating family.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parents from whom he was removed as compared with that of the integrating family to give the child love, affection and guidance and continuing the education of the child.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parents from whom the child was removed
and the integrating family to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care and
other physical, mental and emotional needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and
the desirability of maintaining such continuity.
(e) The permanence as a family unit of the integrating family or person.
(0) The moral fitness, physical and mental health of the parents from whom the child
was removed and that of the integrating family or person.
Id. § 12(3) (a)-(f), at 7.
277 See id.

278 See text accompanying notes 49-53 supra.
279 JUVENILE COURT JUDGES STATUTE, supra note 265, § 4(2), at 6.
280 Id. 9§ 3(2), 4(1), at 6.
281
4(3), at 6.
282 Id. In order to protect the interests of both the child and the parents, provision is made

for appointment of counsel for each. Id. § 7, at 6. The child's counsel must be an attorney
acting as guardian ad litem. Id. § 7(1), at 6. Parents are entitled to counsel if they desire and
the court is empowered to appoint counsel if they are indigent. Id. § 7(2), at 6. Additionally,
the hearing may be conducted informally, id. § 11, at 7, and the standard of proof is merely the

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:1

The second major model statute on termination is denominated
the Model Act to Free Children for Permanent Placement (Model
Act). 28 3 More encompassing than the other reform proposals, the
Model Act attempts to deal with all termination problems in a coora perdinated manner. The general purpose of the Act is to promote
28 4
manent and stable home environment for minor children.
The Model Act deals with grounds for termination in two separate contexts. It deals first with termination by the voluntary act of
the parents.2 8 5 It prohibits voluntary surrenders from taking place
earlier than seventy-two hours after the child's birth. 2 86 After that
time, it allows the surrender to be effective, either directly to the
prospective parents, or through an authorized agency, on petition to
the appropriate court. 28 7 The Act would require that surrender be
confirmed by a court upon a finding that the surrender is in the
child's best interests. 288 It is important to note that the surrender
does not become effective as a termination on its issuance, but only
28 9
on its confirmation by the court.
Involuntary termination under these provisions requires that one
of three conditions be found in addition to a conclusion that the termination is in the child's best interests.2 90 As in most statutes, the
conditions for termination include abandonment and neglect. 2 91 The
Model Act also provides a more complex termination standard where
preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 8, at 6. The doctor-patient privilege cannot be claimed,
id. § 9, at 6, nor can any evidence adduced be admissible in any subsequent civil or criminal

proceeding, id. § 10, at 6-7.
283 HEW, UNITED STATES CHILDREN'S BUREAU, OFFICE OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT, MODEL
ACT TO FREE CHILDREN FOR PERMAANENT PLACEMENT (Feb. 8, 1977 Draft) [hereinafter cited
as MODEL ACT].
284 MODEL ACT, §1 (a), at 1. More specifically, the general purpose of the Act is to:

(1) provide judicial procedures for freeing minor children from -the custody and
control of their legal parents, by terminating the parent-child relationship;
(2) promote the placement of such minor children in a permanent home, either
through adopiion or by vesting their de facto parents with legal guardianship; and
(3) ensure that the constitutional rights and interests of all parties are recognizedand enforced in all proceedings and other activities pursuant to this Act.

Id. § 1(a) (1)-(3), at 1.
Id. § 3, at 13.
Id. § 3(a) (2), at 13.
287 Id. § 3(a), at 13.
285
286

288

Id.

289

id., Commentary to § 3, at 14; see id. § 3, at 13. The comment following section 3

suggests that the requirement of confirmation is included to ensure compliance with the "constitutional standards of due process and . . .constitutional right of family integrity." Id., Commentary to § 3, at 14.
290 Id. § 4(a), at 15.
291

Id. § 4(a) (1), (2), at 15.
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the child has been removed from the natural parents by court order
for a period of one year. 292 This standard is applied if the conditions
leading to the court order still exist, are not likely to be remedied in
the near future, and "the continuation of the parent-child relationship" impedes the child's "early integration into a stable
29 3
home."
Authority to seek involuntary termination under the Act rests
with a variety of persons, but not as large a group as permitted under
the Juvenile Court Judges Statute. 2 9 4 A petition may be filed by an
authorized agency, by either parent with respect to the other parent,
by any guardian of the child, including a guardian ad litern previously
appointed for the child, or by any person who has had physical custody of the child for a period of one year. 295 This does not allow the
"interested person" or peace officer permitted by the Juvenile Court
Judges Statute to bring the petition, 29 6 but presumably their viewpoint would be represented by the guardian ad litem or authorized
agency. 29 7 One factor in this limitation is clearly the fear of involvement by one who has received a child for fostering and then immediately seeks to transform the fostering relationship into an adoptive one. 298 The Model Act would permit such a transition but only
after a substantial period had passed thus allowing the relationship to.
299
ripen into one of psychological parenthood.

292

Id. §

29' Id.

4(a) (3), at 15.
The court is required to appoint a guardian ad litem to protect the child's interests in

all involuntary termination proceedings. Id. § 12(d), at 38. In addition, the court may in an
appropriate case, appoint a guardian ad litem in a voluntary termination proceeding. Id. The
guardian ad litem is required to be an attorney-at-law "experienced in the field of children's
rights." Id. § 13(b), at 42. He is required to conduct a full investigation and consult with all
parties including, where appropriate, the child. Id. § 13(a), at 42. He is entitled to participate
fully in all hearings and must make recommendations to the court regarding the best interests of

the child. Id. In addition, the guardian ad litem is specifically authorized to appeal any disposition. Id. The guardian ad litem is to be compensated by the court rather than by the parties to
prevent the exercise of anv undue influence. Id. § 13(d), at 43; see id., Commentary to § 13, at
44. Moreover, the court is specifically authorized to appoint counsel for an' other party to the
action who desires such appointment and is unable to pay an appropriate fee. Id. § 12(a), at 37.
294 Compare id. § 8(b), at 26 with JUVENILE COURT JUDGES STATUTE, supra note
265, § 3
at 5.
295 MODEL ACT, supra note 283, § 8, at 26. It should be noted that provision allowing a
guardian ad litein to seek termination refers to a guardian appointed "in a prior neglect, abuse

or child protection proceeding," Id., Commentary to § 8, at 27, and not the required appointee
under section 12(d) of the Act, see note 293 supra. MODEL ACT, supra, Commentary to § 8, at
27.
296 JUVENILE COURT JUDGES STATUTE,

supra note 265, § 31(1) (a), at 5.

297 See MODEL ACT, supra note 283, Commentary to § 8, at 27.

298 See id.

299 See id. § 8(b) (4), at 26.
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The due process requirements of notice and an opportunity to be
heard are dealt with explicitly in the statute. 30 0 Notice of the hearing is to be given to the parents, guardians, legal custody holders and
guardians ad litem of the child. 30 ' Notice is not required for the
state agency. 30 2 In cases where the identity of the natural father is
unknown to the petitioner for termination, the statute provides several means of attempting to notify the absent parent. 30 3 "If, after
choosing and acting upon one of the[se] options," the court deems
further notice unlikely "to lead to ... identification of the father,"
and the child is at least thirty days old, the court may terminate the
30 4
father's parental rights without further notice.
The final proposed termination statute is that propounded by
Professor Michael Wald. 30 5 Unlike the two other proposals, this
draft is not in the form of a model statute. As a result, no attempt is
made to deal with the procedural problems in termination, and its
focus is primarily upon termination standards. Wald separates the circumstances for termination into three categories: termination upon
the first hearing of a case;306 terminations other than at the initial
hearing, when the child is less than three years old at the time of the

300 Id.
3o Id.

§ 10(a), at 31-32.
§ 10(a), at 31. A significant difference between the MODEL ACT and existing statutes

lies in the provision permitting an interested party to waive notice of the proceedings. Id. §
10(d), at 32. This is to be contrasted with the currently in force New Jersey statute on adoption

which explicitly proscribes such a waiver. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-45 (West Cum. Supp. 19781979).
302 See
303 Id.

MODEL ACT, supra note 283, § 10, at 31-32.
§ 12(b), at 37. The court has the following options:

(1) inquire of
disclosure bv
(2) determine
likelv to lead

the mother concerning the identity of the father, but may not compel
the mother;
whether notice of the proceedings by publication or public posting is
to the identification of the father, and, if so, order such notification;

but the court shall not include the mother's name in the notice by publication or
public posting without her informed consent;
(3) appoint, if deemed necessary, an attorney as guardian ad litem for the putative

father to conduct a diligent search for him and to report the results to the court; or
(4) deem, after consideration, that all of the above options are futile.

'Id.
304 Id. § 12(c), at 38. At the hearing, all persons who are entitled to notice are permitted to
present evidence as to the appropriateness of termination. Id. § 11, at 35. The court, in its

discretion, is permitted to exclude the child from the hearing, id., but the child's views would
presumably be presented by the child's guardian ad litein. See id. § 12(d), at 38.
305 See generally Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standardsfor
Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and
Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1976).
306 Id. at 693-95.
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placement; 307 and terminations other than at first hearing, when the
child is three years of age or older at the time of placement.3 0 8
Termination at the time of first hearing, the first category of termination, would only be permitted in three circumstances. 30 9 First,
it is permitted where there has been a finding of both abandonment
and endangerment.3 10 Abandonment is defined as a sixty day period
during which "the parents have not cared for or contacted" the
child. 3 1 ' It is a condition precedent to a finding of endangerment,
defined as harmful conduct to the child by a third party to whom the
parent had given custody of the child. 3 12 The two remaining cir-.
cumstances arise where the parent has been found to have abused the
child or its siblings. 3 1 3 One involves the situation in which the child
has remained in the home after the parent has received treatment for
abusive conduct which has recurred. 3 14 In the second situation, the
child has been removed from the home, subsequently returned and
found to be endangered again. 3 15 In both situations, Wald suggests
that the likelihood of the parent being able to benefit from further
treatment is so slight that it is inappropriate for the court to order
3 16
anything other than the termination of the parental relationship.
Even in these cases, however, Wald would permit the court to exercise discretion in deciding whether to terminate, placing the burden
31 7
on the parent to demonstrate that successful reunion is possible.
In the second category of termination, in which the child is
under the age of three when removed from the home, Wald advocates termination when the child has been in placement for six
months. 3 18 Reasoning that the child's attachment to its parents is

307 Id.

at 695.
308Id. at 695-96.
309 id. at 694-95. It is suggested that a wider range of termination at this stage "is too drastic
a policy," considering the lack of "data indicating . . . significant harm as a result of . . . temporary foster care." Id. at 693.
310 Id. at 694 & n.273.

311 Id. Professor Wald also includes within the scope of "abandonment" those parents who
fail to appear at the court proceedings despite adequate notice. Id. at 694.
312 See id. It is noted that a mere absence by the parent does not per se constitute endangerment since the child could be in the custody of a responsible third party. Id. at 694 n.273.
313 Id. at 694-95.

314 Id. at 694. The post-treatment recurrence of physical abuse is indicative of the possibility
that the parent is "untreatable" and that subsequent "therapy is unlikely to be successful." Id.
315 Id. at 694-95.
316 Id.
317 Id. at 695. Professor Wald justifies the exercise of judicial discretion since "[e]fforts to

provide treatment are still in their infancy and therapists are continually discovering new treatment modalities." id. at 694 n.277.
318 Id.
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unlikely to survive this time period, Wald concludes that the child
will probably have identified new psychological parents after a six
month absence from its natural parents. 3 19 Finally, for the child
three years of age or above, a one year placement period would be
necessary prior to termination. 320 The psychological parenthood argument is less persuasive because of the child's longer period of cus32 1
tody with the natural parents.
NATIONAL STANDARDS

In addition to the model statutes discussed above, two national
commissions have examined questions pertinent to the termination of
parental rights. While neither group focused upon the preparation of
a proposed statute, each developed general standards for the guidance of those who seek reform, either through statute or by the reorganization of agencies.
The first of these groups, the National Advisory Committee on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, was created by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the United States Department

319 Id. Professor Wald further notes that "[tihe consensus of expert opinion" concludes that it
is crucial "to avoid multiple placements for children" at such a tender age. Id. It is contended
that such multiple placements result in harm to the child's development and future relationships. Id. Finally, Professor Wald concludes that the foster parent relationship is inadequate for
the child's needs at that point "since the foster parents may avoid ... an emotional involvement out of fear of losing the child." Id.
320 Id. at 695-96. While Professor Wald finds little evidence of harm to the child in foster
placement up to one year, after that point "the balance of harm changes." Id. This conclusion is
reached since parental acceptance of the foster arrangement as permanent tends to increase and
the possibilities of adoption decline. Id. at 696. Finally, while a one-year period is prescribed
the court would not be forestalled from terminating at an earlier point in an appropriate case.
Id.
321 Id. at 696. This longer period of time with the natural parents tends to create some sense
of permanence in the relationship and a "permature [sic] termination" might be more harmful
than beneficial to the child. Id.
Termination after a fixed period of time would not be absolutely required. Id. at 696-99.
Four exceptions to these standards are proposed: (1) where the child would be harmed by termination because of an existing viable relationship with the natural parents, id. at 696; (2)
situations in which a placement is effectuated with a relative who has no intention of adopting,
but will provide permanent care, id. at 697; (3) for children who require special physical or
emotional care, id. at 698; and (4) situations in which placement in a "permanent family" is
either not available or is undesirable, id. at 699. In the first of these cases, termination would
be refused because of the child's strongly perceived need to retain an attachment to its family.
See id. at 696-97. In the latter three, termination is not effected because it is not legally
required for the type of placement sought, and, consequently, there is no need to terminate.
Id. at 697-99. Professor Wald notes that periodic review of the cases would be necessary. See
id. at 699.
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of Justice. 32 2 This group, chaired by Governor Brendan Byrne of
New Jersey, created the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (Task Force), which proposed standards for the
administration of the juvenile justice system, some of which relate to
the status of endangered children and the termination of parental
rights. 3 23
0
The basic purpose underlying the standards proposed by the
Task Force for the termination of parental rights is the fostering of
permanency in the child's relationship, regardless of parental
fault. 32 4 It should be noted, however, that this purpose applies only
in the context of specific recommendations that would make removal
of the child from the home far more difficult than at present. 3 25 The
recommendations require that substantial social services be provided
the parents during the period of removal. 3 26 Additionally, at least
two judicial hearings are required before termination is permitted. 32 7 This standard does not apply, of course, to the circumstances
of a voluntary release of the child for adoption by its parents.
The other national commission which has dealt with these problems is the Institute for Judicial Administration of the American Bar
Association Juvenile Justice Standards Project (Institute), chaired by

322 TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND

DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, NATIONAL ADVIS-

ORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS

AND GOALS, JUVENILE JUSTICE AND

DE-

LINQUENCY PREVENTION (Gov't Printing Office 1976) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].

323 id.; see id. Standard 14.27-.32, at 488-501.
124 Id. Standard 14.32, at 500. The Standard provides:
Statutes governing termination of parental rights should be premised on the
child's need for a permanent, stable family home, not on principles related to parental fault. Therefore, termination should be required if the child cannot be returned home within 6 months to 1 year after placement, depending on the child's
age, unless:
1. Termination would be harmful to the child because of the strength of the
child's family ties;
2. The child is placed with a relative who does not wish to adopt the child;
3. .The child is placed in a residential treatment program and termination is not
necessary to provide a permanent family home; or
4. There is a substantial likelihood that a permanent placement cannot be
found and the failure to terminate will not jeopardize the child's chances of obtaining a permanent placement.

id.
325 Id. Standard 14.27 Commentary, at 488-90.
126 Id. Standard 14.29 & Commientarv, at 494-95.
327 See id. Standard 14.30 & Commentary, at 496-97; Standard 14.32 & Commentary, at

500-01.
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Judge Irving R. Kaufman. 3 28 This group's Drafting Committee on
Intervention in the Lives of Children, chaired by Margaret K.
Rosenheim and Judge William S. White, 329 came to conclusions similar to those proposed by the National Advisory Committee. Unlike
that Committee, however, the Institute considered specifically the
problems of abandonment and ternpnation where the child had not
previously been in placement. 3 30 The Institute would allow termination at a first dispositional hearing under certain limited circumstances. 33 1 Termination would also be allowed at the first hearing where, although the parents had been receiving treatment, the
child, or another child of the family, had been previously removed
from the home, but upon returning was subjected to a new incident
of physical harm. 332 Even in such circumstances the Institute would
not allow termination in certain circumstances 3 33 and such a disposition is not permitted if the child, over the age of ten, objects to
termination. 334
Once the child is in placement outside of its home, the Institute's standards require review of the child's situation every six
months. 33 5 Termination would be automatic at the first six-month review for a child who was placed when tinder the age of three. 336 For
a child older than three at the time of placement, the automatic ter3 37
mination would be effective at the second semi-annual review.

328 ABA INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION,

JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS

PROJECT:

STANDARDS

RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1977) (Hon. Irving R. Kaufman, Chairman)
[hereinafter cited as JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT].
329

Id. at iv.

330 Id. Standard 8.1 & Commentary, at 148-51.

33' Id. Standard 8.2B1, at 151. Those circumstances are enumerated as follows:
a child has been abandoned when he/she has not been cared for or contacted by
his/her parents, although the parents are physically able to do so for sixty days prior
to the adjudicatory hearing, and despite adequate efforts to notify the parents, they
do not appear at the adjudicatory or dispositional hearing.
id.
332 Id. Standard 8.2B2, .2B3, at 151.
333 Id. For the circumstances under which termination is not allowed, see TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 322, Standard 14.32, at 500; note 324 supra.
334 JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, supra note 328, Standard 8.4 Commentary, at

158-61.
335 Id. Standard 7.1, at 135-61.
336 Id. Standard 8.3, at 154. Termination is not automatic, however, if the child could be
returned home, or if the circumstances dictated in the TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 322,
Standard 14.32, at 500, are present. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, supra note 328,

Standard 8.3, at 154.
337 JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS

PROJECT, supra note 328, Standard 8.3, at 154. The same

exceptions to automatic termination pertain to a child three years of age or younger. Id.; see
note 336 supra.
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Termination could occur at the first review only if "the court finds
that the parents have failed to maintain contact with the child during
the previous six months and to reasonably plan for resumption of care
3 38
of the child."
While these two national groups both propose systems that make
it difficult to initially remove the child from its home, once that removal is accomplished, the termination of parental rights is easy. This
dichotomy is a response to the increasing recognition of the child's
need for psychological parents and acceptance of the belief that such
339
parenthood is of a relatively short duration.
CONCLUSION

The increasing frequency of the termination of parental rights
actions in recent years has forced the courts to re-examine the traditional dichotomy of the jurisdictional and dispositional stages in such
proceedings. This examination has made it clear that it is inappropriate to separate the two decisions. If there is a real desire to act in
the best interests of the child, the court must be able to consider not
only the circumstances and actions of the parents, but also the effect
of such actions upon their children.
It is now recognized that termination may be necessary where
parents have not intended to harm their children, but were unable to
provide the emotional support necessary for their proper development. Similarly, it is also acknowledged that the return of a child to
its biological parents after an extended period of separation may be to
the child's disadvantage if a new psychological parenthood has formed
in the interim. Thus, the courts must be free to examine the total
338 JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, supra note 328, Standard 8.3B, at 154. The
Project Committee would also require that one court have jurisdiction of all termination pro-

ceedings. Id. Standard 8.1 Commentary, at 149-50. Furthermore, parents must be given notice

that termination may be considered prior to any hearing at which it may be raised as a possible
disposition. Id. Standard 7.5D, at 143.
In addition to considering the standards for termination of parental rights, the Project Committee also provides standards for the duty of the court following a termination.
When parental rights are terminated, a court should order the child placed for
adoption, placed with legal guardians, or left in long-term foster care. Where possible, adoption is preferable. However, a child should not be removed from a foster
home if the foster parents are unwilling or unable to adopt the child, but are willing
to provide and are capable of providing, the child with a permanent home, and the
removal of the child from the physical custody of the foster parents would be detrimental to his/her emotional wellbeing because the child has substantial psychological ties to the foster parents.
Id. Standard 8.5(A), at 161-62.
339 See id. Standard 7.5D, at 143.
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situation of the child in order to issue an appropriate judgment in
such matters.
That the courts have the power to act in this manner has been
demonstrated in this article. The authority existing under the parens
patriae doctrine allows courts wide discretion to consider any factor
which may be of importance in a child's development. In the exercise
of this power, the rights of both the natural and foster parents are not
ignored, but would be considered as a component of the total perspective with the child's best interest as the focal point. A parent is
entitled to be heard on the termination of his or her rights, but the
right to be heard does not necessarily imply the right to regain custody or guardianship.
The proposed standards for the termination of parental rights restrict the circumstances under which termination may be granted.
They require that certain specific findings be demonstrated before
termination is permitted. If such standards are adopted, then hopefully the courts will not allow them to become a new jurisdictional
test for the termination of parental rights, but rather will employ
them flexibly, under the parens patriae power, as guidelines to be
considered in light of all the circumstances. The decision whether to
terminate parental rights is often the most important decision that can
be made with respect to the future of a child. It is the responsibility
of the courts to retain sufficient flexibility in the making of such decisions so as to assure that the best interests of the child will be protected.

